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PREFAC E
Volume I can be used internally by NASA and externally
by researchers to gain an understanding of the techniques and terms
in cost-benefit analysis.
Volumes I and II, taken together provide an outline of the
cost-benefit procedure and the theoretical foundation for those who
must do an actual cost-benefit study. Volume II contains a hypo-
thetical example of a cost-benefit study.
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION
1. 1 Basic Elements of A Cost-Benefit Study
The basic elements which should ideally be included in the cost-
benefit study are:
1. A definition of the objective to be accomplished in the ERTS
application.
2. Specification of all relevant assumptions under which the
study will be conducted.
3. Enumeration of all reasonable alternatives by which the
objective may be accomplished.
4. Calculation for each alternative of the benefits derived and-
the costs incurred during the undertaking to determine the efficiency
of each alternative.
5.. Enumeration and, where possible, quantifi cation of non-
efficiency considerations associated with each alternative.
6. Ranking 6f the system alternatives on the basis of both
efficiency and. non-efficiency considerations.
These steps are depicted in Figure 1.
1.2 Special Considerations for ERTS Experiments
A distinguishing feature of ERTS experiments is the difficulty of
measuring benefits which are often in the form of externalities (see.
Appendix II, Section E for a discussion of externalities), non-marketable
benefits. Therefore, it is usually necessary to take an "unequal cost/
equal benefit" approach. However, considerable space in this paper
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is devoted to suggesting approaches to the measurement of benefits.
Some progress can be made with conventional analysis, some state-
of-the-art techniques, and some ingenuity. This emphasis on' benefits
distinguishes this manual from similar manuals [59, 61] in other government
agencies which emphasize cost considerations.
Another consideration in an ERTS experiment cost-benefit analysis
is the credibility of the estimates. Since many experiments are being
evaluated simultaneously it is possible to compare the value of 
experiments.
But only if the assumptions behind the estimates, the source of 
the
estimates, and the technique of calculation and classification are clearly
specified can these estimates be evaluated and compared.
'This paper seeks to provide a sound analytic framework for exper-
imenters and a basis from which the credibility of the cost and benefit
estimates can be imputed.
Lack of credibility in benefit and cost estimates often in the 
past has
stemmed from unrealistic consideration of system alternatives 
and from
failure to distinguish between actual and potential benefits of an 
ERTS
experiment. It is important for a sound economic 
analysis that all
reasonable alternatives are specified. Combinations of any of 
three
tiers (ground, aircraft, and satellite) of information gathering maybe
reasonable alternatives. The following four concepts are offered 
as
both an example and actual group of feasible system alternatives:
1. Ground inspection
2. Satellite and ground inspection
3. Aircraft and ground inspection
4. Satellite, aircraft, and ground inspection
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As regards the difference between actual and potential figures it
will be urged that for those benefit estimates for which this is a con-
sideration, the estimating model explicitly considers the ra.tio of
actual to potential benefit and this ratio be part of the overall parametric
analysis. The general cost-benefit model would thus be:
N Bt (Rt) - Ct
NPV =t t t
(1 + Y)t=l.
where
NPV - net present value
N - planning horizon
R - ratio of actual to potential benefit
B - benefit
C - cost
Y " social rate of discount
t - year of project
1.3 Depth of the Analysis
Not all of the techniques discussed below need be or should be a
part of any economic analysis of an ERTS experiment. The depth of the
analysis should depend on the scope and significance of the experiment,
the technical and financial assistance available, and the judgment of the
experimenter. While the analyses described in this paper cover a broad
range they are not definitive and should certainly be supplemented when
appropriate.
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Chapter 2. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
A complete economic analysis to accompany an ERTS experiment
should contain the fbllowing elements: statement of objective, specifica-
tion of assumptions, enumeration of system alternatives, proper
classification, benefit analysis, cost analysis, non-efficiency considera-
tions, and final system selection.
2.1 Statement of Objective
The goal to be achieved by the experiment must be clearly stated.
The statement should specify who will use the information collected,
how it will be used and for what purpose it will be used.
2. 2 Specification of Assumptions ----
The analyst should state all relevant assumptions on which the
study is based.
2.3 Enumeration of System Alternatives
The enumeration should be exhaustive if possible of all reasonable
alternatives for gathering the desired information and it should also
indicate the criteria which will be employed to rank the different systems.
2. 3. 1 All Reasonable Alternatives
Experimenters should consider the desired information as
available from a three tier system. The three tiers are ground,
high-altitude aircraft, and satellite. Individual elements or combinations
of elements of the three tiers may provide the basis of an alternative.
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The following four alternatives are. given as a plausible example:
1. Ground inspection
2. Satellite and ground inspection
3. Aircraft and ground inspection
4. Satellite, aircraft, and ground inspection.
2. 3. 2 Efficiency Criteria for Selecting Among Alternatives
Efficiency considerations, or primary effects, refer to the labor
and capital resources absorbed and the final demand (as defined in
Section 2. 6) met by a given ERTS application.
There are, in general, three classes of criteria which the analyst
may employ when comparing "two or more" alternatives. They all belong
to the general category of cost effectiveness analysis. Cost effectiveness
analysis may be compared to cost benefit analysis which is the process
of assessing whether the benefits of a "single" option are worth the costs.
a. Unequal cost/equal benefit analysis. We may define
the alternative systems such that they all provide equal capability (benefits).
It is then possible to rank them on the basis of the present value of their
life cycle costs.
b. Equal cost/unequal benefit analysis. We may allocate
equal budgets (cost) to each alternative and rank them on the basis of
their technical capabilities or the present value of their benefits within
the planning horizon.
c. Unequal cost/unequal benefit analysis. We may rank
the systems on the basis of the ratio of their costs and benefits. This
criterion is least desirable since-any interpretation of the ratio would
be ambiguous.
For a rigorous discussion of these criteria see Appendix II, Section D.
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2. 3. 3 Non-Efficiency Criteria (Secondary Effects)
The term secondary effects as used in cost-benefit literature is
taken to include all effects outside of efficiency considerations. Each
alternative should be evaluated on the basis of secondary effects where
possible. Where differences arise among systems in their secondary
effects the analyst should rank the systems using these effects as criteria.
Unfortunately the powerful tools developed by the economist for
efficiency considerations often cannot be employed to evaluate secondary
effects. A qualitative ranking is usually possible and is the minimum
which should be provided. The more important secondary effects are:
a. • Income distribution effects. These are shifts in the
relative income flows of various sectors of the economy independent of
the -total level of flows. Does information from the experiment cause the
incomes of one sector to .rise at the expense of another sector? How
does this affect the equality of income distribution?
b. International effects. In particular what will be the
economic impact on the United States of use of data by foreign countries?
And what will be the impact on U. S. foreign trade and balance of
payments?
c. Environmental effects. Efforts of this task should
include:
(1) Identification of potential ERS data impact on the
protection and maintenance of environmental quality;
(2) Evaluation of benefits in terms of desirable
environmental goals (preservation of open s-paces, control of pollution,
prevention of erosion, etc.);
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(3) Evaluation of costs of the alternative systems as
applied to'environmental problems, and
(4) Analyses of environmental impacts in accordance
with the Council onEnvironmental Quality guidelines which require a des-
cription of the proposed project or action, evaluation of probable impact
on the environment (primary and secondary effects), adverse effects which
cannot be avoided, alternatives, the rela.tionship between short term and
long term effects (including cumulative effects), and irreversible or
irretrievable commitment of resources.
d. Social effects. The social analysis should be concerned
with: - -
-(1) -Applying methodology described to social analysis
to identify potential ERS data consequences for persons or groups. Con-
sider implications -for health and life, provision of educational, scientific
and cultural opportunities, amelioration of effects of disaster and for
national security.
(2) Evaluating-benefits (contributions) resulting from
ERS data as it influences employment, and population and the quality of
life for affected populations. The measures used to describe these
benefits may vary but, when possible, should be in dollars, other
quantitative units or qualitative terms. Employment effects should be
specified by income level and job category and include impacts on
minority groups in U. S.
(3) Evaluating costs such as potentially adverse effects
on persons or groups resulting from operation of an ERS system or from
distribution of data.
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Consideration of the secondary effects when they are not expected
to differ from alternative to alternative may be removed for the iteration
and performed after efficiency ranking of the alternatives.
2.4 Classification
The economic analysis should clearly define. the users (as
opposed to the ultimate beneficiaries) of the data, the geographic area
where the benefits are obtained and the costs incurred, and the political
boundaries in which the costs and benefits apply. The classification
necessary for experiments may differ but in general they should include:
1. Users
2. Geographic area
3. Political division
4. Beneficiaries
2. 5 Technical Considerations
The benefits and costs must be estimated in a sound analytical
framework. The center of this framework should be the mathematical
model with proper consideration given to uncertainty of the model
inputs and the time dimension in which the model is being considered.
2. 5. 1 Modeling
The general form of the model relating benefits and costs is
N Bt (Rt) Ct
NPV = to (1+ Y)t
t = l
with the elements of the model as defined in the introduction.
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The analyst must clearly present the specific form of the model.
The model should distinguish in the inputs between government activity
and private activity. It should also represent the level of activity with
which the data is collected and the actual benefits realized should be
expressed relative to the potential benefit.
A slightly expanded general model would then be:
Government activity Private activity
t Y) (1+ Y)
where At = Activity level in period t.
2. 5. 2 Undertainty and Cost-Benefit Estimates
Estimates for ERTS experiments cannot be made with certainty.
Therefore we should not use deterministic modeling, i. e. , we. should
not feed in single value inputs. Rather, the inputs should be fed in
as ranges with a probability associated with each value in the range.
For example, in three years from now the price of a particular high-
altitude aircraft may be anywhere in the range from 6. 8 to 7. 6 million
dollars with the most likely figure 7. 1 million dollars.
(Probability)
6.8 7.-1 7. 6 (Million $)
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Feeding the inputs in as probability distribution functions (PDF) whose
shapes reflect the uncertainty associated with each input means the output
estimate will be generated as a PDF.
a. Probability. Knowing the PDF surrounding output
estimates enables the analyst to quantify the uncertainty of his estimates.
It also enables him to quantify the uncertainty associated with decisions
based on his estimates. An example of quantifying the uncertainty
associated with a decision is given at the end of section C in Appendix II.
While PDFs are sometimes given with estimates, quantification of
decision uncertainties is rarely done although it is a simple extension
and a useful technique for the decision maker. Therefore, the uncertainty
associated with decisions in selecting among system alternatives should
be quantified where possible.
b. Risk analysis. The most commonly used technique for
generating PDFs is the form of risk analysis known as Monte Carlo
simulation. A detailed discussion of risk analysis is given in section C
in Appendix II.
c. Sensitivity analysis. Sensitivity analysis seeks to
answer a specific question of uncertainty - to changes in which of the
inputs is the output estimate most sensitive. This is found by perturbing.
each of the inputs, one by one, from its most likely value and observing
the resulting impact on the estimates and decisions. The perturbation
may be by:
(1) Equal absolute amounts
S(2) Equal relative amounts
(3) Equally likely amounts (when combined with
input PDFs)
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Sensitivity analysis indicates which input factors are most
important to the decision to be made and where the greatest effort
should be expended in collecting more input data.
2. 5. 3 Time and Cost- Benefit Estimates
Time makes its impact on the value yardstick of money through
inflation, by the selection of project life, by society's preferences
for present consumption as opposed to future consumption, and by new
opportunities and situations developing within the project's life.
a. Constant dollars vs. current dollar. All inputs and
estimates should be done in constant dollars, i. e., deflated dollars.
b. The planning horizon. The selection of a planning
horizon can be critical to determining the economic worth of a project and
care should be taken in selecting it. A full discussion of the planning
horizon is given in section A, Appendix II.
c. Discounting and present value. A dollar spent today
is not the same as a dollar spent three years hence nor is a dollar spent
three years hence the same as a dollar .spent six years hence. This is
because present consumption is more desirable then postponed consumption.
Therefore, in order to compare the different cash flows over time for
the alternatives being considered it is necessary to discount future
cash flows into a common denominator -- their present value.
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d. Dynamic costing. When it is foreseen that new
opportunities may present themselves during the life of a project there
are two methods for handling this situation. The usual method is to have
two alternatives, one in which the possibility becomes a reality and
the other in which it fails to become a reality. The full net present
value calculation is done for both possibilities.
The second method, known as the dynamic costing method explicitly
incorporates the uncertainty of a future development into the net present
value model. The arrival of new opportunities is viewed as a Markov
process and optimal decision strategies.can be developed. While
dynamic costing is still a state-of-the-art development it may be
considered for those experiments where future technical developments
will have a major impact. For a rigorous discussion of this method
see [19] and [55]
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2.6 Benefits
The benefits from an ERTS information application will
be equal to the "final demand" for public and private goods
and services which are met. Final demand refers to the de-
sire for products as an end in themselves. Final demand is also
known as direct demand. These products may be compared to
products desired because they help produce products desired for
themselves. These intermediate products' meet derived demand.
An example of final demand is the sale of an automobile to a consumer
by General Motors. An example of derived demand is the sale of
machinery by a m'anufacturer to General Motors.
It is first necessary to list all the benefits (final demand)
of the specific application, quantify them for each year of the
project, reduce all figures to their present values, and repeat
this process for all alternatives.
2. 6. 1 Several Approaches
It is necessary to use several analytic techniques when
attempting to quantify benefits. This is because the value of publicly
consumed goods, which are frequently provided free or at nominal cost,
is not as easy to ascertain as the value of privately consumed goods.
The two general techniques employed are cos't effectiveness analysis and'
supply and demand analysis. Besides the discussion in Section 2. 6. 3 in
this volume, these techniques are discussed rigorously in Section D,
Appendix II.
-14-
2. 6. 2 Listing Benefits
The-first step in benefit analysis is a complete listing of all
benefits. They should be cross classified as public or private,
domestic or international, quantifiable or non-quantifiable, and as
efficiency or non-efficiency consideration. A form for this listing is
offered in Appendix IV.
a. Efficiency considerations. An attempt must be
made to quantify all efficiency considerations, i. e., those. which
impact on the level of final demand.
(1) Public. Publically offered goods and services
must be separated from privately offered goods and services. An
example of a public service is the water resource management
function of the government.
(2) Private. This area encompasses all final goods
and services offered in the private market place.
(3) Actual benefits vs. potential benefits. The
actual effect on final demand may be considerably below its poten-
tial, it may approach its potential as the particular application is
better utilized, it may drop away from its potential as substitutes
appear in the future. Explicit consideration should be taken of
these cases by the analyst. The technique of learning curves
(change in time) may be applied on the benefit side similar to the
way it is applied on the cost side. Instead of decreasing costs as
we "learn" to operate more efficiently, we "learn" to reap more
of the potential benefits. See [26].
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b. Non-efficiency considerations. An attempt should
be made to quantify non-efficiency considerations where possible.
These include all effects other than the impact on the level of
final goods and services. These are the so-called secondary ef-
fects some of which were discussed above.
2. 6. 3 Measuring Benefits
Supply and demand analysis offers a method for measuring the
impact on final demand of the private sector and to a limited extend for the
public sector. Benefits should be quantified over the life of the project and
di'scounted to present values. In measuring benefits it is most desirable to
use parametric methods for reasons discussed in the section on uncertainty.
a. Probability distributions. It is improbable that
benefits accuring from an ERTS application can be treated as
"known". Estimates must be made with uncertain inputs. These
inputs should be entered as probability distribution functions.
b. Demand analysis; price considerations. Cost an-
alysis is usually straight forward and enables us to handle supply
shifts. But demand analysis is more complex. Therefore, this
section on demand analysis is more rigorous than the rest of
Volume I.
Theoretically we can measure the benefits to society
of an ERTS application as follows. If the ERTS information enables
producers to supply quantities of a given product more cheaply we
will have a downward shift in the supply function of this product.
This is represented in the following diagram as a shift from SO
to S:
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P
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Initially at price PO the consumer had a surplus equal to the
area PoPmA This is the consumer's surplus because it repre-
sents.,the extra value consumers are willing to sacrifice rather than
do without a given good.
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Alternatively, consumers were willing to pay OPmA0Q 0
but they only had to pay OP 0 A 0Q 0 which .left them with a net
benefit (surplus) of PO mA 0
After the shift to S1 the consumers' surplus or net benefit
increases to PIP A 1 In other words, the net benefit has increased
by P1 Po0 AA 1. This area, P1PoAoA1
, represents the value of the
ERTS information benefit.
There is extensive econometric literature on estimating such
supply and demand functions. Once the supply and demand functions
and the shift in the supply curve are known the benefit (increase in
consumers' surplus) may be calculated.
Further, the increased net benefit may be broken down into
two types. There is a direct benefit equal to P 1P0 A 0Y because
the quantity OQ which sold for OP before now sells for OP 1.
There is also an induced benefit equal to YAo A which accrues to
the consumers who were "induced" by the lower price to buy the
product.
While this technique is acceptable for measuring the benefit
from private activity, it is not applicable directly to government
activity which frequently renders goods and services free of charge
or at a nominal rate. However, cost-effectiveness provides' a rough
solution to this problem through the equal capability approach and
-18-
the equal budget approach.
If we re-label the axis on our supply and de'nand diagram
from (price) and (quantity) to (budget/capability) and (capability)
we have
Budget/ Capability
B 0 0 S0B0
D.
B0
I
0 CO  C 1 Capability
The benefit provided by the government is equal to B B A A1.
To estimate this area we first assume equal capability (C 0 ) and
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compare the budget with (B 1) and without (B 0 ) ERTS information.
The area B B A Y is the direct benefit from ERTS in that it
enables the government to provide the same goods or service at a
lower budget outlay. To get the area YAo A we need to know the
shape of the demand curve. The usual procedure is to assume
unitary elasticity (a given percentage increase. in capability gener-
ates a similar percentage decrease in budget). We then assume
equal budget (B1 ) but an increase in capability from C O to C1 . We
are then able to calculate YA 0 A 1. The total benefit from govern-
ment activity is
B1 0 0 A1 = B A 0Y + YA 0 A 1
The above analysis cannot generally apply when a totally new
product or service is produced by ERTS because the demand 
function
cannot be obtained. If the new product, however, has the same attributes
as some already existing p roduct, extrapolation of demand may be 
possi-
ble by the abstract commodity approach. An example of an abstract
commodity is "transportation." Its attributes are cost and time. The
supersonic transport jets are a new product but offering the same abstract
commodity, transportation, as regular jets but with different attributes of
time and cost. From these attributes the demand for transporation on
supersonic jets may be extrapolated.
While this is still a state-of-the art technique some progress
has been made. See [2].
ci Definition of ben efits. Benefits may be defined as:
(1) The increase in consumer surplus due to meeting
direct demand at a lower price.
(2) The increase in consumer surplus due to meeting
derived demand at a lower price (This is actually a cost reduction. )
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.(3) A cost reduction.
d. Externalities; Non-price considerations. Externali-
ties are non-marketable benefits (or costs). " These usually require
government intervention since the natural play of market forces
exerts no control on them. See section E, Appendix II.
e. Selecting a discount rate. The selection of a dis-
count rate' is a critical choice and a full discussion can be found
in section B of Appendix II.
In general the discount rate should reflect society's
marginal social preference for present consumption over future
consumption. It is also useful for purposes of comparison that
analyses use the same discount rate. With these two facts in mind,
the executive office of the president recommends tant a 10% dis-
count rate be used [ 58 . The impact of using other rates
such as 5% and 15% s hould be tested where possible.
There is also some confusion as to when discounting should
begin.
1. If the outlays and benefits a re realized in lump sum at
the beginning of each year, discounting should begin with
the second year (first discount factor is 0. 909).
2. If the outlays and benefits are realized in lump sum at
the end of each year discounting should begin with the
first year (first discount factor is 0. 909).
3. If the outlays and benefits are realized in a steady
stream (the usual case) over each year, discounting
should begin with the first year (first discount factor
is 0. 954).
Discount factors for the 10% discount rate are given in
Appendix III.
2.7 Costs
2. 7. 1 General Considerations
Costs of a particular application should reflect the true
opportunity foregone by society. Costs should only be incremental
costs, i. e., the extra costs incurred that would not have been incurred
if the application were not taken. Therefore, this excludes all sunk
costs since they are costs which will not be incurred in the "future"
of each investment alternative. Costs of government activity should
be distinguished from costs of private activity. Costs should be entered
as probability distributions reflecting the unicertainty surrounding them.
a. Opportunity costs. Opportunity costs are the true
foregone alternatives of society in undertaking a project.
b. Shadow prices vs. market prices. Market prices generally
are the best indication of opportunity cost. Market prices may fail to
indicate the true opportunities lost to society by a given investment,
for example, if there are price controls on goods and services
purchased during the life of the project or the domestic currency is
overvalued/undervalued and some of the outlays are for goods and
services supplied by foreign sources. In these cases "shadow prices"
should be used. Shadow prices are a specific example of opportunity
costs which arise as the solution to particular pricing techniques. For
a general discussion of shadow prices in cost-benefit analysis see [14]
2. 7. 2 Life Cycle Costing
All costs should be specified for each year of the life of the
project. Examples of forms which might be useful in a life cycle
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costing effort are presented in Appendix III. Detailed listing of
items in a Life Cycle Costing Effort may be got from [62]
a. Non-recurring costs. Non-recurring expenses include
all one time expenditures for research, development, testing, evaluation
and investment for the application.
(1) RDT&E.
(2) Investment.
b. Recurring costs. Recurring costs include all personnel
and non-personnel outlays involved in the operation of the application.
(1) Personnel costs.
(2) Non-personnel costs.
c. Productivity measurement. Results should be presented
as averages as well as totals where possible. This will be useful as a
productivity measure over the life of the project and for purposes of
interproject comparison.
2. 8 Measurement of Non-Efficiency Considerations
The same principles of evaluation, time and classification
which apply to the efficiency considerations should be observed for
those cases when non-efficiency considerations are classified.
2. 9 System Selection
After repeating the analysis outlined above for each system the
systems should be ranked and some indication should be given of
recurring to non-recurring costs for each system.
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2. 9. 1 Ranking
The systems should be ranked by.their efficiency considerations
as a minimum. Where non-efficiency considerations are important
the systems should be ranked but the quantifiable benefits and costs should
be kept separate from the efficiency consideration figures.
2. 9. 2 Trade-Off Analysis -
For each system the results of the cost analysis should include
a trade-off analysis which indicates the ratio of one-time costs to
operational costs. For example
Non-recurring costs
Satellite, aircraft, ground
Satellite, ground
Aircraft, ground
Ground only
Recurring costs per year
for equal capability
obje ctive s.
-24-
2.10 Cross Reference Chart
The following chart cross references the "steps in a cost-
benefit analysis" and some of the 'economic principles and quantitative
methods" applied in these steps. The checks indicate where the
particular principles and techniques are generally employed. Where
possible, references are given both to the general cost-benefit
literature and to the cost-benefit work Mathematica has done for NASA.
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Appendix I. HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE
This appendix offers a hypothetical cost-benefit example
employing a selected number of techniques and following the procedure
outlined in Volume I.
Background of Hypothetical Example
The Department of Interior does aerial surveys of public
grazing lands. These surveys are used to allocate the grazing lands
to livestock breeders and, on a more limited scale, to develop manage-
ment plans.
The aerial surveys provide information on the immediate forage
conditions and the long-range trend in forage conditions. This information
can be used to determine where range conditions can be improved, e. g.,
by seeding, and whether livestock breeders should build up their herds
or sell off some of their stock. These management plans in the long
run should lower the cost of raising livestock and, therefore, the price
of meat to the consumer. This management procedure is illustrated with
a tree diagram in Figure IA-1.
Besides lower meat prices another benefit from remote sensing
is less damage to grazing lands from over-grazing. Remote sensing
provides a better guide to the number of animals a land area can bear
than random assignment or assignment with superficial ground
inspection.
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The Objective
The objective is assumed to be an increase in remote sensing
surveys of grazing lands, both public and private, in order to develop
management plans to better utilize available forage and ultimately to
lower the price of meat to consumers.
Assumptions
The surveys will be conducted for both public and private grazing
lands (government lands are 27% of total grazing lands). Surveys will
be taken 4 times within each year.
There are two types of classification errors. Type I is
classifying land as available for larger stocking than it can bear. Type II
is classifying land as unavailable for foraging when in fact it is available.
The first error leads to land damage due to over grazing, the second
error leads to higher feed costs when more expensive feeds are
substituted in place of foraging.
It is assumed that the life of the project (planning horizon) will
be ten years. The rate of discount will be ten percent.
An equal capability approach will be taken, i. e., each alternative
remote sensing system will be assumed to survey the same land area.
Therefore, the direct benefits from each alternative system will be
the same but the cost reductions and direct costs will differ. Cost
reductions will be considered as benefits and added to direct benefits
to get total benefits.
It is further assumed that there are two aircraft equipped for
aerial photography and a satellite which may be employed. They represent
A-3
sunk costs, however, and the initial investment in them and the launch
costs are not to be included in the calculations below.
Alternatives
The objective may be achieved by three alternative means:
1. Extended application of the aircraft surveys which are
already undertaken.
2. Use of earth resources technology satellite.
3. A combined use of aircraft and satellite.
Classification - Aircraft Only System
It is assumed the remote sensing will be carried out by the
government, specifically the Bureau of Land Management within the
Department of the Interior will coordinate all efforts. The information
will be dispensed to livestock breeders trade associations and individual
breeders, the ultimate consumer of meat is the American consumer
(international trade considerations are ignored in this example).
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Benefits -- Aircraft Only System
A list of expected benefits may be found in Table IA-1. In this
example, only the direct, induced, and cost savings benefits will
be considered.
Figure IA-2 is a flowchart of the benefits model used for all
three system alternatives. The benefits from meeting direct demand
are the same for all three systems. The systems will differ in cost
savings because the probability of a Type I or Type II error will differ.
Aircraft surveys provide better resolution in photos than satellite surveys.
The benefits are a function of the land area surveyed (the activity
level). It is assume-d that the full benefit§ will not be realized and this
is incorporated explicitly in the benefits model.
The model is (assuming a linear demand function)
B 1 = Apx Q 0
B 2 = p x Ex Q 0 x (A p/PO) x .5
B3 = L [(C1 T 1 + C 2 T 2 ) - (C 1 T 3 + C 2 T 4]
BT = (R) (A) [B 1 + B 2 + B 3 ]
where BT = Total Benefits
B 1  = Potential Direct Benefits
B 2  = Potential Induced Benefits
B 3  = Cost Savings
R = Ratio of actual to potential benefits expected
A = Activity level (% of land photographed)
L = Total grazing land area in U. S.
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Table IA-1. Enumeration of Benefits
Probability that Benefit Extent to Which Benefit Non-Efficiency
Inter- Govern- Quanti- Non-Quanti- I Almost Efficiency (Secondary
Form of Benefit Domestic national ment Private fiable fiable Possible Likely Certain Partially Fully Fully Consideration Effect)
.More Beef to Consumer J I IV
Lower Cost to Consumer V /
More Info to Farmer / / I/
More Info to BLM J
Improve Trade Competi- / /
tive Position
Reduce Damage to ' /" / / / /
Grazing Land
Lower Production / /
Costs to Farmers
Figure IA-2. Benefits Model
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Ap = Decrease in meat prices
P 0 = Original price
Q0 = Original quantity
E = Elasticity of demand
C1 = Cost of Type I error
C2 = Cost of Type II error
T 1 = Probability of Type I error using remote
sensing system (i)
T 2 = Probability of Type II error using remote
sensing system (i)
T 3 = Probability of Type I error without remote sensing
T 4 = Probability of Type II error without remote sensing.
Price/lbs.
AI
Aq *D
Quantity (in million
Q0 1 dollars)
Direct benefits = Ap x Q0
Induced benefits (shaded area) = Ap x Aq x .5
(Assuming a linear demand function)
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Economists relate relative changes in price and quantity demanded by
the concept of elasticity. Elasticity is defined as the percentage change
in quantity due to a given percentage change in price. Or:
AQ
Elasticity = E -
P 0
We derive the induced benefit function with elasticity explicitly included
as follows:
Induced Benefits Function
B 2  Apxqx.5 x(
= Ap x Aq x . 5 x E x (ap/PO0 )/(Aq/Q 0 )
= Apx Aqx.5 x Ex (ApfP 0 ) x (Q0 /Aq)
Ap x .5 x Ex (Ap/P 0 ) x Q0
Apx Ex Q0 x (Ap/PO) x .5
Costs - Aircraft Only System
Figure IA-3 is a flowchart of the aircraft only cost model. The
satellite only and the aircraft/satellite cost models are also included
here as Figures IA-4 and IA-5.
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Figure IA-3.
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Figure A-4
Satellite Only Cost Model
Recurring
Activity Level Costs
(As %9 of Grazing
land Photographed)
Total Area
Photographed
Per Survey
(mTo
Total Grazing Total
Land Area' Costs
>2
(mi) Total Cost of
a s Interpretation &
Distribution of
Photos ($)
f of Photo
Survey Per
SYear r I IYear. 
RDT&E
Government
Activity ($)
Non-Recurring
pCost of Interpreta- Costs
tion & Distribution
of Photos I RDT& E
($ oer mi 2 ) PrivateActivity ($)
Figure IA-5
Aircraft/Satellite Cost Model
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The aircraft only cost model is:
R = (L).(A) (S) [P 1 + P 2]
N =(X) (T) + R + R + (R ) (M)g P a
C=R +N
C - Total costs
R - Recurring costs
N - Non-recurring costs
L - Total grazing land area
A - Activity level (As % of grazing land.photographed)
S - Number of surveys per year
P 1 - Cost of photographing
P2 - Cost of interpretation and distribution
X - Number of extra aircraft required
T - Cost per equipped aircraft
R - RDT&E for government activity
R .- RDT&E for private activity
p
R - Number of aircraft required
a
M - Routine maintenance costs per aircraft per year.
Input Data
The following figures were assumed for the most likely values:
$12, 000 - Cost per mile squared of a Type I error (C 1 )
$ 6, 000 - Cost per mile squared of a Type II error (CZ)
2. 5% - Probability of Type I error with aircraft (T 1 )
3. 0% - Probability of Type II error with aircraft (T'2 )
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3. 0% - Probability of Type I error without remote sensing (T 3 )
3. 5% - Probability of Type II error without remote sensing (T 4 )
. 36 million mi 2 - U. S. grazing land area (L)
$1. 26 - Initial price/lb. of meat (P 0 )
$0. 0095 - Price change (Ap)
.42 - Elasticity of demand for meat (E)
11, 000 million lbs - Initial quantity of meat demanded (Q0)
4 - No. of surveys per year (S)
$4. 40 - Cost per mile squared of photographing (pl)
$2. 20 - Cost per mile squared of interpreting and
distributing photos (P 2 )
10% - Discount rate
10 - Total aircraft required (Ra)
a
8 - No. of extra aircraft to be purchased (2 already available) (X)
$1. 83 mil - Cost of fully equippe'd aircraft (T)
$530, 000 - Cost of operation and maintenance per aircraft
per year (M)
$1. 45 mil, $. 45 mil - RDT&E government expenditures in
first two years of project (R g)
$. 97 mil, $. 23 mil - RDT&E, private expenditures in
first two years of project. (R p)
Activity levels and ratio of actual to potential benefits realized
each year are indicated in the computer output below.
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Note: It is assumed that the demand for meat grows at 2% a
year due to population growth and income increments.
In addition to these most likely figures for each variable a
probability distribution was assumed, e. g.
$16,000 High Cost, Type I error
9,000 Low
triangular distribution
Probability
Cost, Type I Error
$9 $12 $16
Monte Carlo simulations were run (1,000 runs) and the results of
one iteration are present as computer output Tables 1 to 6.
The costs were distributed between the public and private sector
by assuming that the cost of photographing would be passed on to the
livestock breeders (private) but that the costs of interpretation and
distribution, aircraft investment and maintenance would be borne by
the government.
The summary of costs and benefits for this single iteration are
presented in Table 5 of the computer output.
Ranking Systems
The above procedure was repeated for the satellite system
and the aircraft/satellite system. The results are presented in Figure IA-6.
On the basis of net present value the aircraft/satellite system is preferable.
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TABLE 1
COSTS---GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY
(UNDISCOUNTED COSTS - IN MILLION DOLLARS)
SYSTEM ALTERNATIVE -- AIRCRAFT ONLY
NON-RECURRING COSTS RECURRING COSTS
ACTIVITY ACTIVITY
LEVEL LEVEL ANNUAL
FISCAL YEAR RDT&E INVESTMENT DEPENDENT INDEPENDENT COSTS
1974 0.97 14.64 3.01 5.30 23.93
1975 0.23 0.00 6.03 5.30 11.57
1976 0.00 0.00 6.03 5.30 11.34
1977 0.00 0.00 6.03 5.30 11.34
1978 0.00 0.00 6.03 5.30 11.34
1979 0.00 0.00 6.03 5.30 11.34
1980 0.00 0.00 6.03 5.30 11.34
1981 0.00 0.00 6.03 5.30 11.34
1982 0.00 0.00 6.03 5.30 11.34
1983 0.00 0.00 6.03 5.30 11.34
TOTALS 1.21 14.65 57.37 53.01 126.25
ITERATION NUMBER -- 714
TABLE 2
COSTS - PRIVATE ACTIVITY
(UNDISCOUNTED COSTS - IN MILLION DOLLARS)
SYSTEM ALTERNATIVE -- AIRCRAFT ONLY
NON-RECURRING COSTS RECURRING COSTS
ACTIVITY ACTIVITY
LEVEL LEVEL ANNUAL
FISCAL YEAR RDT&E INVESTMENT DEPENDENT INDEPENDENT COSTS
1974 1.45 0.00 5.94 0.00 7.39
I.. 1975 0.45 0.00 11.88 .... 0.00 __ 12.33
1976 . 0. 0.00 11.88 00 11.88
1977 0.00 0.00 11.88 0.00 11.88
1978. 0.00 0.00 11.88 0.00 11.88
1979 0.00 0.00 11.88 0.00 11.88
1980 0.00 0.00 11.88 0.00 11.88
1981 0.00 0.00 11.88 0.00 . 11.88
198Z 0.00 0.00 11.88 0.00 11.88
1983 0.00 C.00 11.88 0.00 11.88
TOTALS- 1.91 0.00 112.93 0.00 114.85 ..
ITERATION NUMBER -- 714
TABLE 3
TOTAL~ COST-__ _
(UNDISCOUNTED COSTS - IN MILLION DOLLARS)
SYSTEM ALTERNATIVE -- AIRCRAFT ONLY
ANNUAL ANNUAL
GOVERNMENT PRIVATE COSTS DISCOUNT COSTS
FISCAL YEAR ACTIVITY ACTIVITY UNDISCOUNTED FACTOR DISCOUNTED
1974 23.93 7.39 31.33 1.00 31.33
1975 11.57 12.33 23.91 0.90 21.73
1976 11.34 11.88 23.23 0.82 19.19
1977 11.34 11.88 23.23 0.75 17.45
1978 . 11.34 11.88 23.23 0.68 15.86
1979 11.34 11.88 23.23' 0.62 14.41
1980 11.34 11.88 23.23 0.56 13.10
1981 11.34 11.88 23.23 0.51 11.91
1982 11.34 11.88 23.23 0.46 10.82
1983 11.34 11.88 23.23 0.42 9.84
TOTALS 126.25 114.85 241.11 165.70
ITERATION NUMBER -- 714
TABLE 4
. . BENEFITS
(IN MILLION DOLLARS)
SYSTEM ALTERNATIVE -- AIRCRAFT ONLY
RATIO OF ANNUAL ANNUAL
POTENTIAL POTENTIAL ACTUAL TO BENEFITS BENEFITS
DIRECT INDUCED COST POTENTIAL ACTIVITY REALIZED REALIZED
FISCAL YEAR BENEFITS BENEFITS SAVINGS BENEFITS LEVEL UNDISCOUNTED DISCOUNTED
1974 103.97 0.16 134.98 0.10 0.25 5.97 5.97
1975 106.25 0.16 134.98 0.17 0.50 20.52 18.65
1976 108.59 0.17 134.98 0.25 0.50 30.47 25.17
1977 110.98 0.17 134.98 0.25 0.50 30.76 23.11
1978 1'13.42 0.17 134.98 0.25 0.50 31.07 21.21
1979 115.92 0.18 134.98 0.25 0.50 31.38 19.47
1980 118.47 0.18 134.98 0.25 0.50 31.70 17.88
1981 121.08 0.19. 134.98 0.25 0.50 32.03 16.42
1982 123.74 0.19 134.98 0.25 0.50 32.36 15.08
1983 126.46 0.19 134.98 0.25 0.50 32.70 13.85
TOTALS 1148.94 1.82 1349.90 279.02 176.88
ITERATION NUMBER -- 714
TABLE 5
COST-BENEFIT SUMMARY
(IN MILLION DOLLARS)
SYSTEM ALTERNATIVE -- AIRCRAFT ONLY
ANNUAL ANNUAL
BENEFITS ANNUAL NET CUMULATIVE
REALIZED COSTS PRESENT PRESENT
FISCAL YEAR DISCOUNTED DISCOUNTED VALUE . VALUE
1974 5.97 31.33 -25.35 -25.35
1975 _8.65 21.73 -3.08 -28.43
1976 2"5.17 19.19 5.97 _ -22.45
1977 23.11 17.45 5.66 -16.79
1978 _._ 21.21 15.86 5.35 - -11.44
1979 19.47 14.41 5.06 -6.38
1980 17.88 13.10 4.78 -1.60
1981 . 16.42 11.91 4.51. 2.91
1982 15.08 10.82 4.25 7.16
1983 13.85 9.84 4.01 11.18
TOTALS 176.88 _ 165.70... . 11. 19
ITERATION NUMBER -- 714
TABLE 6
INTERMEDIATE OUTPUTS
(UNDISCOUNTED COSTS - IN MILLION COLLARS)
SYSTEM ALTERNATIVE -- AIRCRAFT ONLY
COST OF
INTER-
COST OF MISCLASSFI.CATION. PRETATION
LAND DAMAGE HIGHER COST OF.. LAND AREA. AND DIS-
PUBLIC PRIVATE FEED. PHOTO-. PHOTO- TRIBUTION
FISCAL YEA R  LAND LAND COSTS 
GRAPHING GRAPHED* OF PHOTOS.
1974 27.61 74.66 59.46 5.94 0.34 
3.01
1975 55.22 149.31 118.93 11.88 0.68 6.03
1976 55.22 149.31 118.93 _ _ 11.88 
0.68 6.03 .
1977 55.22 149.31 118.93. 11.88 0.68 
6.03
1978 55.22 149.31 118.93 11.88.. 0.68 6.03
1979 ._ 55.22 149.31 __ 11893 _____11.88 
_ 0.68 6.03
1980 55.22 149.31 118.93 . 11.88 _0.68 6.03
1981 55.22 149.31 118.93 11.88 .0.68 6.03
1982 55.22 149.31 .. _. 118.93 1___ _ 1.88 0.68 .. 6.03
1983 55.22 149.31 118.93 11.88 0-68 6.03
TOTALS 524.67 1418.53 1129.87 112.93 . 57.37
* - IN MILLION SQUARE MILES_ .S.. . ____ _
TOTAL-NUMBER OF PLANES -- 10
PERCENT OF GRAZING LAND PHOTOGRAPHED -- 50
ITERATION NUMBER -- 714
Figure IA-6. Results of Risk Analysis
A. Aircraft Only
Frequency 1, 000 iterations
250 Mode = 1.79
Mean = 1. 81
Standard Deviation = 5.2
Net Present
_- Value
-20 -8 +8 +20 (million $)
B. Satellite Only
Frequency
50 
Mode = -3. 31
Mean = -3. 27
.Standard Deviation = 5. 2
Net Present
----- + Value
-20 -8 0 +8 +20 (million $)
C. Aircraft/Satellite
Frequency
1, 000 iterations
250 -
Mode = 3.'76
Mean = 3. 71
Standard Deviation = 5. 4
Net Present
Value
-20 -8 0 +8 +20 (million $)
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Since the difference between the mean net present values of the
aircraft system and the aircraft/satellite system is $1. 9 million ($3. 71-$1. 81)
with a standard error of $7. 5 million ( /(5. 2)2 + (5. 4)2 ) we may conclude:
There is a 60% probability that we will make the correct choice in
selecting the aircraft/satellite system as more cost effective
than the aircraft only system.
Also, since the difference between the rhean net present values of
the satellite only system and the aircraft/satellite system is $6.98 million
with a standard error of $7. 5 million we may conclude:
There is an 82/0 probability that we will make the correct choice
in selecting the aircraft/satellite system as more cost effective
than the satellite only system.
And finally we may conclude:
There is a 59% probability that we will make the correct choice
in selecting the aircraft/satellite system as more cost effective
than both the aircraft only system and the satellite only system.
Using Bayes' rule and defining A as the event that one system dominates
the other two, B the event aircraft/satellite (A/S) dominates aircraft
only (A) or (A/S >A), B the event (A > A/S), B 3 the event satellite (S)
dominates A/S or (S >A S) we-get
P(B 1 /A) = [P(Bl) x P(A/B 1 )]/[P(B1 ) x P(A/B 1 ) + P(B 2 ) x P(A/B 2)
+ P(B 3 ) x P(A/B 3)] = [. 60 x . 82]/[(. 60 x . 82) + (.40 x .75)
+ (. 18 x 25)] = .588 = 59%
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Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity analysis in this section is performed for the aircraft
only system which has served as an illustration above rather than the
highest ranked system, the aircraft/satellite system.
The most likely values for the aircraft system were put into the
computer model using a 10% discount rate and the results are found in the
following computer output Tables 1 to 6. The program was run again
changing only the discount rate to 5% first, then 15%. The results were
Discount Rate Net Present Value Benefits Costs
5 $10.53 M $207.85 M $197.33 M
10 1.79 167.65 165.87
15 - 4.42 138.49 142.93
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TABLE 1
COSTS - GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY
(UNDISCOUNTED COSTS - IN MILLION DOLLARS)
SYSTEM ALTERNATIVE -- AIRCRAFT ONLY
NON-RECURRING COSTS RECURRING COSTS
ACTIVITY ACTIVITY
__LEVEL- LEVE.L _ ANNUAL._ _
FISCAL YEAR _ RDT&E INVESTMENT DEPENDENT INDEPENDENT COSTS
1974 0.97 14.64 2.99 5.30 . 23.90
S1975 _ 0.23 0.00 5.98 5.30 11.51
1976 0.00 0.00 5.98 __.5.30 ___ 11.28
1977 0.00 0.00 5.98 .. .. 5.30 11.28
S1978 ..... .00 0.00 5.98 5.30 11.28
1979 0.00 0.00 5.98 5.30 11.28
1980 . 0.00 0 .00 - . 5.98 ........ 5.30 -- 11.28
..__ .. 1981 0.00 0.00. .. 5.98 5.30. __ 11. 28
1982 0.00 .0.00 5.98 5.30 11.28
1983 0.00 0.00 5.98 . 5.30 .. 11.28
TOTALS . 2. 14.65. 56.85 53.01 125.73 - L
MOSTLIKELY VALUES
TABLE 2
COSTS- PRIVATE ACTIVITY
(UNDISCOUNTED COSTS -- IN MILLION DOLLARS)
SYSTEM ALTERNATIVE-- AIRCRAFT ONLY
NON-RECURRING COSTS RECURRING COSTS
ACTIVITY ACTIVITY
LEVEL LEVEL ANNUAL
FISCAL YEAR RDT&E INVESTMENT DEPENDENT INDEPENDENT COSTS
1974 . 1.45 0.00 5.98 0.00 7.43
1975 0.45 0.00 11.96 0.00 12.42
1976 0.00 0.00 11.96 0.00 11.97
1977 0.00 0.00 11.96 0.00 11.97
1978 0.00 0.00 11.96 0.00 11.97
1979 0.00 0.00 11.96 0.00 11.97
1980 0.00 0.00 11.96 0.00 11.97 .
1981 0.00 0.00 11.96 0.00 11.97
1982 0.00 0.00 11.96 0.00 11.97
1983 0.00 0.00 11.96 0.00 11.97
TOTALS 1.91 0.00 113.70 0.00 115.62
MOSTLIKELY VALUES -
L . . ... ................. " -. ... 
. ...... 
.
TABLE 3
TOTAL COSTS
(UNDISCOUNTED COSTS - IN MILLION DOLLARS)
SYSTEM ALTERNATIVE -- AIRCRAFT ONLY
ANNUAL ANNUAL
GOVERNMENT PRIVATE COSTS . DISCOUNT __. COSTS
FISCAL YEAR . ACTIVITY ACTIVIDTY UNDI.SCOUNTED FACTUR DISCOUNTED
1974 23.90 7.43 31.34 1.00 31.34
1975 . 11.51 12.42 23.94 .. 0.90 .. 21.76
-. I %)1976 11.28 11.97 23.26 0.82 19.21
1977 11.28 . 11.97....... 23.26 0.75 . 17.47
1978 11.28 11.9723.26 .... 0.68 15.88
...1979 .... ... 11.28. 11.97 _ 23.26 0.62 14.43
1980 11.28 11.97 23.26 0.56 13.12
1981 11.28 11.97 23.26 0.51 11.92
. _1982 ... 1., 2 8 11..97._._ 2 3 . 2 6 . .46 .84
1983 11.28 .. 11.97 23.26 ....... 0.42... .. 9.85
TOTALS 125.73 115.62. 241.37 165.87
MOSTLIKELY VALUES
TABLE 4
,BENEFITS
(IN MILLION DOLLARS)
SYSTEM ALTERNATIVE -- AIRCRAFT ONLY
RATIO OF ANNUAL ANNUAL
PUTENTIAL POTENTIAL ACTUAL TO ENEFITS BENEFITS
SDIRECT INDUCED _COST --.-- POT ENTI AL ACTIVITY REALIZED_._ REALIZED
FISCAL YEAR BENEFITS BENEFITS SAVINGS BENEFITS-- - -LEVEL UNDISCOUNTED DISCOUNTED
1974 104.50 0.16 _ 122.39 ........ 0.10 0.25 5.67 _ 5.67
!N 1975 .. 106.58 0.16_ !22.39 0.17 0.50 - 19.47 _____ 17.73
1976 108.72 0.17 122.39 0.25 0.50 . 28.91 23.88
1977 110.89 .0.17 122.39 0.25 0.50 29.18 21.92
1978 .' .113.11 0.17 _ 122.39 0.25 0.50 29.46 __ 2 .11
1979 115.37 0.18 122.39 0.25 0.50 29.74 18.46
1980 117.68 0.18 122.39 0.25 ........ 0.50 30.03 16.94
1981 120.03 0.19 122.39.... 0.25 0.50 30.32 ..__ 15.55
1982 122.43 0.19 122.39 0.25 0.50 30.62 14.27
1983 124.88 0.19 .122.39 0.25 0.50 30.93 13.13
TOTALS 1144.25 1.82 1224.00 264.39 _ 167.5
MOSTLIKELY VALUES
- * * * ** *4* ** .. .. . . ..
TABLE 5
SCOST-BENEFIT SUMMARY
(IN MILLION DOLLARS)
SYSTEM ALTERNATIVE -- AIRCRAFT ONLY
ANNUAL " ANNUAL
BENEFITS ANNUAL NET CUMULATIVE
REALIZED COSTS PRESENT PRESENT
FISCAL'YEAR DISCOUNTED DISCOUNTED VALUE _ VALUE
1974 5.67 31.34 -25.66 -25.66
1975 17.70 21.76 -4.05 -29.72
1976 23.88 19.21 4.66 -25.05
1977 21.92 17.47 4.44 -20.60
1978 20.11 15.88 4.23 -16.36
1979 18.46 . 14.43 4.02 -12.34
1980 16.94 13.12 3.82 -8.52
1981 15.55 11.92 3.62 -4.89
1982 14.27 10.84 3.43 -1.46
1983 13.10 9.85 3.25 1.78
TOTALS 167.65 165.87 1.79
MOSTLIKELY VALUES
TABLE 6
I INTERMEDIATE OUTPUTS
(UNDiSCOUNTED COSTS - IN MILLION DOLLARS)
SYSTEM ALTERNATIVE -- AIRCRAFT ONLY
*****t* * 44
COST OF
INTER-
COST OF MISCLASSIFICATION PRETATION
LAND DAMAGE HIGHER COST OF LAND AREA AND DIS-
PUBLIC PRIVATE FEED PHOTO- PHOTO- TRIBUTION
FISCAL YEAR LAND LAND COSTS GRAPHING GRAPHED* OF PHOTOS
1974 27.54 74.46 61.20 5.98 0.34 2.99
1975 55.08 ........ 148.92 122.4011.96 0.68 5.98
1976 55.08 148.92 122.40 11.96 0.68 5.98
1977 55.08 148.92 . 122.40 11.96 .... 0.68 5.98
1978 55.08 148.92 122.40 .. 11.96 0.68 5.98
1979 55.08 148.92 122.40 ___ 11.96 0.68 5.98
190 55.08 148.92 .... 122.40 11.96. 0.68 5.98
1981 55.08 148.92 122.40 11.96 0.68 5.98
1982 55.08 148.92 122_4) 11.q6 0.68 . 5.98
1983 .55.08 148.92 122.40 11.96 0.68 5.98
TOTALS 523.27 1414.77 1162.82 113.70 56.85
* .- IN MILLION SQUARE MILES
TOTAL NUMBER OF PLANES -- 10
PERCENT OF GRAZING LAND PHOTOGRAPHED -- 50
These results may be illustrated as follows:
Aircraft Only System
Discount Rate
15
11.
10
NPV
-4.42 0 +1.79 +10.53 (billion $)
The rate of return (where discount rate gives a net present value of
zero) for the aircraft system is 11. 25%0.
The different results indicate that benefits in this project will be
realized gradually in time and if less value (i. e., higher discount rate)
is given to future benefits then the system will be considered less desirable.
Other variables were perturbed one at a time and the results are pre-
sented as Table IA-6.
Table IA-6 indicates that the most sensitive variables are the probabilities
of misclassifying land by a type I or type II.error and the percentage of potential
benefits of which livestock growers can take advantage.
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Tables IA-6
Sensitivity Analysis
(In Million Dollars)
Resulting Total Variation from
Perturbed Variable*: Net Present Value Unperturbed Case
Ratio-Actual to Potential Benefits 18. 56 +16. 77
Percentage Change in Meat Prices 9. 90 + 8. 11
Quantity of Meat Demanded 9. 89 + 8. 10
Cost Due to Error Type I 7. 57 + 5.78
Activity Level 7.33 + 5. 54
Cost Due to Error Type II 4. 68 + 2. 89
Shift in Demand Over Time 2. 51 + 0.72
Elasticity of Demand 1. 81 + 0.02
Cost of Interpretation & Distribution -1. 94 - 3.73
Cost of Photographing -5. 69 -. 7.48
Probability of Type II.Error -15. 53 -17.32
Probability of Type I Error -27. 09 -28. 88
*Perturbation = Ten Percent Increase
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Trade-off Analysis
If we compare the total non-recurring costs (TNRC) to the annual
recurring costs (ARC) for each of the alternative systems we derive
a trade-off function between initial investment and operating expenses
with equal capability.
System Costs
(in million dollars)
Aircraft Satellite
Only Only Aircraft/Satellite
TNRC $17.75 $ 3.12 $ 8.71
ARC 22. 33 27. 84 24. 66
ARC
28 Satellite
25
Aircraft/Satellite
2 ---- Aircraft
S . TNRC
6 12 18
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Appendix II. ELABORATION OF SOME *ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES
A. Planning Horizon
The assumed "economic uselife" of an investment project is
normally something shorter than infinite because of one or a combination
of the following factors:
1. Factors Inherent in the Project Itself:
a. One of the physical inputs to the project depreciates
over time, collapses at.a point in time (one hoss-shay
depreciation) or becomes unavailable at a point in
time (e. g., a rented piece of land, or an exhaustible
supply of raw materials).
b. The demand for the product or service yielded by
the project may drop off or disappear altogether
after some time.
2. Factors Inherent in the Decisionmaker:
a. The decisionmaker is risk averse and deliberately
chooses a finite and possibly short investment horizon
as a risk adjustment.
b. The decisionmaker limits the investment horizon to
his own life expectancy.
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Since the present discussion is concerned exclusively with
public investments in satellite systems, item 2(b) above can be dismissed
from consideration altogether. Furthermore, it has been argued in an
earlier report by Mathematica [8] and in the pertinent economic literature
at large [63] that the government should not be risk averse in evaluating
alternative public projects. This means that a public agency should not,
because of risk averseness, shorten the investment horizon (N) of a public
project arbitrarily. On the basis of this argument, item 2(a) above can be
eliminated from consideration as well.
With respect to item l(b) above, it can probably be assumed that
with growing industrialization and population 'density there will continue
to be a steady -- or even increasing -- demand for earth observation, at
least for the next four to five decades. But at discount rates greater than,
say, 5 percent, the present value of a steady stream of annual benefits
increases only at a sharply diminishing rate with increases in the investment
horizon, as is indicated in Figure A-15 for one specific case.
In Figure IIA-1 the symbol PV (r, N) denotes the present value of a
steady stream of annual benefits obtained for N consecutive years and
discounted at some discount rate r > 5 percent. As may be inferred
from Figure IIA-2 the assumption of a 40 or 50 year project horizon is
nearly equivalent to assuming, for purposes of evaluation, an infinite
horizon, Thus, if it is reasonable to assert that the demand for earth
oriented remote sensing programs will continue into the indefinite
future, one really needs to be certain only that it will continue for at
least the next four to five decades.
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H ~APV DUE TO CHANGE IN N
FROM 40 TO 50 YEARS
L - PV (r, N)
0
APV DUE TO CHANGE IN N
Z FROM 10 TO 20 YEARS
I I i I
0 10 20 30 40 50
N (INVESTMENT HORIZON IN YEARS).
Figure IIA-1. The Effect of the Investment Horizon
(N) on The Present Value of a Steady
Stream of Benefits
The formula, with an infinite planning horizon, is:
n
PV , Bt Bn
(1+ Y )t 7 (1 +y)n
The terms are as defined on page 4 of Volume I, except for n
which is now defined as the year in which benefits. stabilize at some
steady stream value. The formula implies the benefits accrue in
lump sum at the end of each year.
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This leaves us with point a(a) above, i. e., with the question of
whether a physical input into ERTS-1 type program will become
unavailable at some future point in time, and if so, when.
Since the blueprints and documentation for ERTS-1 type systems
exist and any number of identical or upgraded satellites can be built, point
a(a) can also.be eliminated from consideration.
The argument for an infinite horizon evaluation may be made from
a second viewpoint which is made with reference to Figure IIA-2.
00 A
0 : I
I
D
E
ot tn
1972 L TIME
Figure IIA-2. Illustration of the Project Horizon
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The assumption is made, as above, that an earth resources survey program
will continue into the indefinite future. It is further assumed that the
annual cost of the earth resources survey program by conventional means
is OA and with the aid of ERTS-1 type technology it is OB. The
economic benefits attributable to the ERTS-1 technology are BA per year.
Based upon an equal capability analysis, it is expected that at some point.
in time, say, t n , that a technological advance will occur that further
reduces the cost of the.programto ED per year, realizing an additional
savings of DC per year. It would be an error to attribute to the new
technology DF in annual savings even though it replaces the ERTS-1
technology that will be under study. Any decision to introduce the new
technology should be based upon its incremental benefits, DC versus its
incremental developmental costs. So long as there is an earth resources
survey program, the original savings should be attributed to the ERTS-1
type technology, which is an infinite horizon approach for each feasible
investment alternative presently definable.
B. Social Rate of Discount - The Theoretical Underpinnings
Briefly, society's rate of time preference may be defined as a
rate of interest which reflects consumers' subjective, relative evaluation
of given quantities of consumables one year hence; then their rate of time
preference is said to be 0. 05 = 10 - 1 5 percent. Alternatively
the rate of time preference may be defined as the rate of interest which
consumers would have to be offered in order to persuade them to
sacrifice additional current consumption in favor of additional future
consumption.
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Any investment project -- public or private -- involves the
sacrifice of consumables at some point in time for the sake of increased
consumption at one or more subsequent points in time. From the very
definition of the rate of time preference, it is clear that this rate must
somehow be reflected in the social rate of discount used in the evaluation
of public projects.
There is, however, still another side to the social discount rate:
the social opportunity costs of a public project are the benefits foregone
when the economic resources used by the project are diverted from the
private to the public sector. The social rate of discount should reflect
these opportunity costs as well.
Let us assume, for example, that all of the resources devoted
to a public project would have been used in the private sector for
investment outlays promising an annual rate of return of 10% before
corporate income taxes and after an allowance for. the eventual replacement
of worn out equipment. Suppose $1 billion in resources were transferred
to the public project. Then the public project could be justified economically
only if it also promised a benefit stream (necessarily accruing to members
of the private sector at large) equivalent to an annual benefit stream of
$100 riillion (10% of $1 billion). An alternative way of expressing this
is that the present value of the benefit stream produced by the public
project, discounted at r = 10%, must be at least as high as $1 billion,
or that the net present value (NPV) of the project must be greater than or at
least equal to zero.
1It may seem unusual to see the output from a remote sensing system
defined as a consumable. The point is that the output from ERTS-1
becomes input into production processes which ultimately do yield consumable
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The interest rate concept used in the preceding paragraph is
sometimes referred to as the time productivity of economic resources.
It is the rate of return which society is able to earn in the private sector
by sacrificing current consumption in favor of future consumption, i. e.,
by investing economic resources in productive investment projects. In
contrast, society's rate of time preference is the rate of return for which
society is willing to sacrifice current consumption for the sake of increased
future consumption. These two interest-rate concepts should not be
confused: the rate of time productivity is an objective, technical concept;
the rate of time preference, on the other hand, is a purely subjective
magnitude.
It can be shown that, in the imaginary world of classical economics,
the savings and investment behavior of society -- through the nation's.capital
markets -- would always drive the economy to an equilibrium position
in which all individuals exhibit the same (social) rate of time preference,
all investors face the same (social) rate of time productivity and in which,
moreover, the social rate of time preference would be just equal to the
social rate of time productivity. This overall equilibrium market rate
of interest would then be the appropriate. discount rate to be used for
public-project evaluation. See [81
Unfortunately, the real world differs significantly from the happy
state of affairs in the classical model. For one, individual investors
face different degrees of risk and differ in their attitudes toward risk.
The rate of return required by private investors therefore include risk
premiums which differ over the spectrum of investor.
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Secondly, the tax system does not treat all investors in the private
sector equally. Corporations, for example, face tax rates that differ
from those paid by unincorporated businesses, and there are also differences
in the rates paid by different unincorporated business firms. To earn the
same after-tax rate of return, different business firms must therefore
earn different pre-tax rates of returns on their .marginal investments.
Finally, net-savers in our economy typically obtain rates of return
on their savings that differ from the rates faced by net borrowers. Different
consumers therefore are characterized by different rates of time preference.
In short, then, in the real world there exists no single market
rate of interest which can be viewed as the appropriate discount rate for
public project evaluation. The rate being used for that purpose must
therefore be a weighted average of the various rates prevailing in the
market.
In the real world, a resource transfer from the private to the
public sector does not usually come solely from private investment projects
part of the resources will surely come from private .consumption. It
follows that the opportunity costs of the resource transfer must reflect
not only the spectrum of rates of return on foregone private investments,
but also the spectrum of time preference rates of those who sacrificed
current consumption. This requirement confronts one with enormous
difficulties in any attempt to estimate the appropriate level of the social
discount rate for practical applications of benefit-cost analyses.
1 This has been thoroughly dealt with in [8)
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Suffice it to say that the fundamental idea underlying this estimation
process is always the same; one seeks to estimate the magnitude of the
sacrifice borne by the private sector when resources are transferred from
private consumption or investment to public-sector use, and to express
this sacrifice in the form of an annual rate of return, r.
The Level of the Social Rates of Discount in the'United States
Table IIA-1 presents a sample of discount rates estimated with
painstaking effort by various professional economists. It should be
emphasized that the economists' estimates were made at different points in
time, i. e. , under different capital-market conditions. But this circum-
stance alone cannot explain the wide variation in these estimates; rather,
the variation reflects for the most part differences in the conceptual
framework used by these economists.
From existing surveys it is apparent that historically neither the
various U. S. government agencies nor professional economists have so
far been able to agree on an appropriate social rate of discount. The
rates of discount implicitly or explicitly adopted by Federal agencies
span a range from 0 percent to 15 percent. (In some cases this rate
actually may be less than zero when outright subsidies are given in the
financing of projects with a negative return in undiscounted dollars).
The rates suggested by economists span the somewhat smaller range
from 4 percent to roughly 14 percent.
In view of the prevailing uncertainty about the proper social rate
of discount, some economists would prefer not to select a unique discount
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Table IIA-1
Social Rates of Discount Recommended by Various Economists
Author Year Rate
Krutilla and Eckstein 1958 5 to 6 percent
Hirschleifer, DeHaven,. and Milliman 1960 10 percent
Hufschmidt, Krutilla and Margolis 1961 4 to 5 percent
Weisbrod 1960 10 percent
Friedlaender 1965 5 percent1
Bain, Caves and Margolis 1966 5 to 6 percent
Stockfish 1967 13. 5 percent
Baumol 1968 10 percent
Eckstein 1968 8 percent
Harberger 1968 10. 68 percent
The author adjusts for risk by assuming a relatively short use life
for the (highway) investment project being evaluated.
Source: J. Hirschleifer and D. L. Shapiro, Table 1, pp. 517, of
author's publication.
A-43
rate at all, but instead to evaluate public projects in terms of an entire
set of alternative rates. For want of a better term, we shall call this
method the flexible approach. Pushed to its logical limit, the flexible
approach amounts to the derivation of the net present value curves for all
projects being evaluated for a reasonable range of discount rates, say
from zero to 10 percent. The overall evaluation can then be presented
simply in terms of a diagram such as Figure IIIA-3 which depicts the
discount-rate sensitivity of three hypothetical investment projects.
The advantage of the flexible approach is immediately apparent
from Figure IIA-3. For Alternative 1, the approach clearly indicates
acceptance of the project for the example chosen, since the project has
a positive net present value over both the range of discount rates suggested::
by economists (4 to 14 percent) and that suggested by federal agencies (0
to 15 percent). Similarly, Alternative 3 would probably be rejected since
it has a positive net present value only at rates lower than those recommended
by economists. The more flexible approach thus provides one with
information about the sensitivity of'the acceptance criterion to the
analyst's assumptions concerning the discount rate.
However, the flexible approach is not particularly helpful in one's
evaluation of Alternative 2. Clearly, it is small comfort to know that
there are some rates, acceptable to some analysts, at which Alternative 2
would be acceptable, when there is also an entire range of recommended
rates at which the project would be deemed to be "uneconomic". In
other words, for Alternatives such as 2 the flexible approach begs the
question entirely.
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ALTERNATIVE 2
0
ALTERNATIVE 3
ALTERNA-
RANGE OF RATES USED BY FEDERAL AGENCIES
RANGE OF RATES SUGGESTED BY ECONOMISTS
0 2 4 6 8 O 10\2 14 16 18 z(
DISCOUNT RATE
(PERCENT)
Figure IIA-3. Project Evaluation: Net Present Value as a
Function of Discount Rates Used
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At some stage of the evaluation of the ERTS-type systems, the
range of plausible social discount rates must be sufficiently narrowed to
overcome the ambiguities left by the flexible approach. This narrowing
of the range of plausible rates, however, cannot proceed on a rational
basis unless the arbiter has at least some understanding of the conceptual
issues involved in the estimation of the social rate of discount. Only on
the basis of such an understanding can a government agency decide or
argue that say, 7. 5 percent is likely to be a better approximation of the
true social rate of discount, than, say, 12 percent.
The effect of the rate of discount on the evaluation of the four invest-
ment alternatives may be examined between the ranges of 5 and 15 percent
(for all integer numbers). A sample output of one alternative evaluation
for one particular case study is shown in Table IIA-2.
C. Risk Analysis
Risk analysis is a means of developing quantitative measures of
the uncertainty associated with ventures and providing numerical estimates
of the range of probable outcomes.
Variation in costs will arise in ERTS experiments due to the
reliability with which cloud cover permits adequate pictures, the sat-
ellite functions, the photos are collected processed and distributed,
etc. -Beside the question of technical reliability of the overall system
there is the uncertainty of the costs incurred in all steps of the system
over its life.
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Table IIA-2. Net Present Value of Alternative 3 Equal Budget Efficiency Calculation
(in millions of 1972 dollars)
'STUDY HORIZON SYSTEMS DISCOUNT NPV NPV NPV
COSTSAVINGS INDUCED TOTAL
BENEFIT
CASE-D INF. A3 VS BASE 1 2.867 1.318 4.186
2 2.417 1.104 3.522
3 2.045 .928 2.973
.4 1.735 .782 2.518
5 1.477 .661 2.139
6 1.261 .560 1.822
7 1.080 .476 1.557
> 8 .928 .406 1.334
A 9 .799 .347 1.147
10 .691 .297 .988
11 .598 .255 .854
12 .513 .220 .740
13 .452 .190 .643
14 .395 .16, .550
15 .3"t6 .143 .489
16 .3)3 .124 .428
17 .267 .108 .375
18 .235 .095 .330
19 .208 .083 .291
20 .184 .073 .257
A3 VS BASE = Alternative 3 versus Baseline (No system)
Because of the many areas of uncertainty which influence costs,
it is not realistic to consider costs as being well defined, single valued
functions. Costs can be described as illustrated in Figure IIA-4 where
costs are shown as ranges of possible values with different probabilities
of falling into various parts of the range. And because annual cost is a
function of probabilistic costs, it too will have a probability distribution.
The annual costs are derived using the previously developed costing
model, collecting inputs as probability distributions by "off-the-cuff"
estimates of experts or by the Delphi technique [25] , and performing
simulation.
The simulation uses Monte-Carlo*'techniques to establish the
probability distributions (risk profiles) of the different events, their
annual costs and total cost.
The simulation iteration works as follows:
(i) First, a number for each of the input factors in the system
cost model is obtained by "sampling" from their
respective probability distribution for each year of the
project.
(ii) Next the system cost model is used to calculate the
total cost. This constitutes one simulation.
*Monte-Carlo implies the repetition of a modeled experiment, sequence
of events, physical process, etc., whose component outcomces are pro-
babilistic, a sufficient number of times to generate a "smooth" profile
or histogram of all possible outcomes. This resulting profile of predicted
outcomes for the model is then normalized to a relative frequency profile
which represents the probability density function for the experiment's
outcomne.
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Figure IIA-4. Probability Density Functions for a Stream of
Uncertain Costs
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(iii) The process outlined in (i) and (ii) is repeated a
large number of times (say 1000) and the results
tabulated in the form of histograms. See Figure IIA-5
for an example.
(iv) Finally, these histograms are printed together with
summary statistics in the form of reports which are
useful to the analyst.
The overall procedure in risk analysis is outlined in Figure IIA-6.
While this section has spoken only of the cost model, the same risk analysis
can be applied in those cases where benefits are quantifiable and uncertainties
exist.
Having the total cost estimate of a system as a probability dis-
tribution function rather than a single value estimate enables the
decision maker to attach some measure of certainty to his choice.
Chance variation in the input variables is usually allowed for
by sensitivity analysis. But sensitivity analysis asks only over what
range the original policy choice holds when just one of the input variables
is permitted to vary. Nor does it permit statements of probability.
Further, a deterministic model implies an optimal decision can
be correctly made each time the appropriate data are collected. But,
in fact, the empirically given problem permits incorrect decisions
even when the appropriate data are available and collected properly.
This is because many of the variables are estimates with random errors
rather than "knows. "
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Figure IIA-5. Results of ERTS Experiment
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Figure IIA-6 Risk Analysis Procedure
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More realistic and more powerful statements and decisions
can be made if the cost model is used with probabilistic variables.
This procedure is also more consistent with the manner in which
input data will be collected.
The following example illustrates how sensitive total cost
estimates are to variation in the input data.
In an earlier paper by MATHEMATICA [47] the following
hypothetical analysis was conducted.
Four systems were considered for a survey to detect strip
mining violations:
P 1 = Ground (men) only
P2 = Satellite + Ground
P 3 = Aircraft + Ground
P 4 = Satellite + Aircraft + Ground
Systems Px and P3 were found to be most efficient with the cost
of survey (in $1,000) for
P 2 = 36. 6
P 3 = 34.5
But these estimates depended to a great extent on our ability to
make proper decisions from aircraft or satellite photos. We are given
a = probability "good" area is misclassified as a problem area
p = probability a problem area is misclassified as good.
s,a - denote satellite and aircraft respectively
By assuming reasonably small random variation in these two
variables, a and p , we can see that there is a one in four chance
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that an incorrect choice of systems will be made.
Under P 2 we are given the following cost function
C 1 = 2, 700 + 47, 500 ( s ) + 97, 500 ( Ps)
$36, 575 = 2, 700 + 47, 500 (. 20) + 97, 500 (. 25)
Under P3 we are given the following cost function
C 2 = 17, 500 + 97, 500 ( pa ) + 47, 500 ( aa)
$34, 500 = 17, 500 + 97, 500 (. 15) + 47, 500 (. 05)
For P 2 let a = 20 + . 02 and =. 25 + .02 and both
be normally distributed.
Further, let Then Z, Z 1 , Z will be normally
distributed with2 ( / ; ():
Z = (C 1 - 2, 700) (33,875; 1, 429)
Z 1 = 47, 500 as (9, 500; 950)
z = 97, 500 s  (24, 375; 1, 950)
Therefore, C is normally distributed with (36, 575; 1, 429).
For P 3 let a = .15 + .02 and a = .05 + .01 and both be normally
distributed.
Further, let Then V, V , V2 will be normally
distributed with ( ; r ):
V = (C - 17,500) (17,000; 2, 007)
V1 = 97, 500 fa (14, 625; 1, 950)
V = 47, 500 aa (2, 375; 475)
" 21/2
From = l + '2, = (a 1 2 + a2 )
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A
Therefore, C2 is normally distributed with (34, 500; 2, 007).
A A
Finally, C = C 1 - C 2 is normally distributed with (2, 075; 2, 464).
) 2, 75 C
-0.8! 0 Z
Note: The probability that C 2 is greater than C 1 (i. e., C < 0)
is .2996 or about 30%.
Conclusion: There is a 70% probability that we will make the
correct choice in selecting Policy 3 (Aircraft + Ground) in this case
as the more cost effective system.
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D. Definition and Measurement of Benefits
Broadly speaking, benefits can be estimated for private groups
(individual corporations) or for public decision makers.
Benefits in the context of private entities (corporations, individuals)
are usually defined as the net revenues expected to flow from the in-
vestment alternatives under consideration. The economic value of
these benefits is determined by the market place and conveniently
expressed in monetary units.
Benefits in the context of public decision makers do not usually
accrue in the form of a monetary revenue stream; instead, a monetary
value must typically be imputed indirectly. Examples for such analysis
can be found in:
1. Multipurpose River Developments
2. Highway Construction
3. Investment in Health
4. Nuclear Reactor Development Programs
5. Space Transportation System Investments
The measurement of benefits for public investment evaluation is
an extremely intricate and challenging problem. We discuss in the
following a consistent, and we hope acceptable, approach that has been
implemented in practice.
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Measurement cf Benefits in the Absence of Market Indicators: Cost-
Effectiveness and Cost-Benefit Analysis.
In.the economic literature, the terms "cost-benefit" and "cost-
effectiveness" are sometimes used as equivalent terms. Cost-benefit
analysis applies for one alternative system. If there are three alternative
systems available for achieving the objective, we apply cost-benefit
techniques three times under restrictive assumptions (e. g., equal
capability or equal budget) to get a cost-effecti~reness analysis. Cost-
benefit analysis is also defined as the broader task of selecting a single
system from all of the possible cost-effective candidates.
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Technical Innovations
A technological innovation such as an ERTS-1 system will change
the efficiency frontier for earth resources management. In general,
technological change will shift the efficiency frontier, F 0 , as shown
in Figure IIA-7 upwards and towards the left (see also Figures IIA-8
and IIA-9). If one evaluates an efficient project prior to the introduction
of the new technology, e. g., point PO, (the baseline technology), one
sees that PO is not any more cost-effective with regard to the new
efficiency frontier Fl--and in the absence of the (necessary) non-
recurring costs. That is, after technological change and innovation
have taken place, we can find, with the new technology, other systems
that provide the same capability at less cost (P 1 ) or more capability
at the same budget level (P 2 ).
Technological change does not always "rain" onto society in a
steady stream; the more recent history of technology, especially in
space related activities, suggests that technological change must
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Figure IIA-7. The Scope of Cost Effectiveness Analysis
of New Technology Choices
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commonly be "purchased" by substantial investments in RDT & E and
initial investment in new hardware. Suppose now that it is known with
a fair degree of certainty that a given RDT & E effort considered
separately will be capable of shifting the cost-effectiveness frontier
from its present position (e. g., from line F 0 to line F 1 in Figure IIA-7).
Within the confines of cost-effectiveness analysis (strictly defined)
one may now ask the following questions:
(a) Equal capability efficiency
What is the net cost saving which can be achieved by
adopting the new technology, and are these cost savings
(i. e., P 0 - P 1) large enough to justify the incremental
(non-recurring) outlay on RDT & E and new hardware ,
over the uselife of the new system? (Figure IIA-8).
and
(b) Equal budget efficiency
What increases in -capability are brought about by technological
change, at the same budget level, after the new system has
been introduced, and will the economic value of this added
capability justify the required, incremental outlays on
RDT & E and new hardware over the uselife of the new
system? (Figure IIA-9).
Question (a) above is by far the easier one to answer from an
empirical point of view. In answering that question, one need only make
the assumption that the expenditure on a capability prior to the development
1 Excluding those costs which have been "sunk."
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Figure IIA-9. Equal Budget Cost Effectiveness Analysis
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of the new technology represents the economic value of this capability
to society. Based upon this assumption, a very conservative and
objective estimate of the benefits from the new technology is the
annual cost savings achievable at the activity level purchased under
the old technology. If it is found that the total cost saving, aggregated
over the uselife of the project and adjusted for the time value of
economic resources, more than covers the initial outlays on RDT & E
and hardware for the new system, then one may unambiguously conclude
that based upon cost effectiveness, the new system should be developed
and adopted.
It is much more difficult, in practice, to answer question (b)
above. For the question really amounts to asking:
(b') Given the fact that we can increase our capability due to
the introduction of a new technology, -does the economic
value of the added capability justify the required additional
expenditures up to an equal budget outlay?
Clearly, this question cannot be answered unless one can, in fact,
place a value on the additional capability. In other words, question (b)
really requires.one to know society's demand curve for the activity in
question.
Benefit Measures That Result From Cost-Effectiveness Analyses
Given the two limiting ranges of cost-effectiveness analysis (equal
capability and equal budget) the benefits attributed to the investment alter-
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natives when compared to the Baseline technology are shown in
Figure IIA-10. The Equal Capability Benefits are simply the estimated
cost reductions expected from the use of alternative technology choices.
The Equal Budget Benefits are augmented by the area under the Equal
Budget Demand Curve, and the marginal costs of the technology alter-
native (MCI) for the increased activity level.
Once we are involved in the placing of economic values, a further
extension of cost-effectiveness analysis is suggested, i. e., benefit-
cost analysis. In principle, at least, there is no reason why question
(b') above should be confined to a unique budget outlay. One might just
as legitimately ask whether the economic value of any additional capa-
bility justifies an expansion of the budget required to achieve it. That
is, any addition to expenditures (budget) may be justified so long as
the economic benefits associated with the incremental capability at
least offset the incremental expenditure.
It is obvious, then, that cost-effectiveness analysis in the narrow
sense of that term as defined above has at least one severe shortcoming:
the approach abstracts entirely from the pertinent question whether or not
marginal changes in project scale (i. e., in the proposed budget level or
in the proposed effectiveness level) are economically desirable. A
fundamental theme of our argument is therefore that cost-effectiveness
alone -- either question (a) or (b) -- constitutes a simplified view of
the problem.
A-62
) Incremental
st per Survey
Equal Budget Demand for Surveys
MCB C0-- A
Baseline
Cost Savings Capabilit
per Survey Unit B nefits
Equal
Budget
Benefits
Alternative i D MB
Mci. D Mci I
Induced Activity
I
0 Baseline Survey Number of Units
Activity Surveyed per Year
Figure IIA-10. Benefit Measures Resulting from Cost-Effectiveness
Analysis
A-63
The Direct Measurement of Benefits (When Market Indicators are
Present)
The previous section discusses alternative approaches for a
benefit-cost analysis of data from ERTS-1 earth resources observation
systems when the information gathered is used for providing public goods.
This is typically the case when the users of information belong to the
public sector. The values of services or goods they provide cannot
be determined by the market prices, since they are usually free or
charged only with a token fee. It is expected that the information
gathered from ERTS-1 type earth resources observation systems
can be useful not only to the public sector but also private sector.
This information may be provided to the private sector with or without
charging the fees. The pricing policy actually adopted will undoubtedly
affect the cost and supply of producing consumer goods, since the infor-
mation is used as an input. The problems of optimum pricing and re-
sources allocation have been examined elsewhere [2] . The following
discussion will be based on the assumption that the pricing policy has been
settled, and the costs of information to the private producers of final
consumption goods are known. Therefore, the introduction of ERTS-1
type earth resources observation systems can be treated simply as a
shift of supply curve of the final consumption goods.
How critically important such considerations are for the economic
and social benefit evaluation of projects was illustrated by the movement
of wheat prices in the summer of 1972.
Furthermore, we shall assume that the supply curve, which also
reflects the industry marginal cost curve,, is sloping upward, i.e.,
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decreasing returns to scale. On the other hand, the demand curve is
assumed to be sloping downward. Based on these basic assumptions,
we shall analyze how the market equilibrium of a final consumption
goods, e. g., agricultural products, which is likely to be affected by
the ERTS-1 type earth resources observation systems may be expected
to change. More importantly, we shall attempt to sketch a framework
which may be useful in evaluating the economic value of an ERTS-1
type earth resources observation system to any private industry. The
analytical framework is very general and is similar to what we have
employed for evaluating the economic value of information for the public
sector producing public goods. The main" differences between the
analyses of this and the previous section rest on the fact that the demand
curve can now be estimated from the observations on consumer's be-
havior (instead of government budgetary decision) and that the supply
curve (or marginal cost curve) reflects the behavior of the firms (not
merely the technical feasibility).
Without discussing the details of the short-run versus long-run
and micro versus macro, we shall somewhat arbitrarily assume that we
are interested only at the macro (or more appropriately, industry) level
for a short-run equilibrium situation. Furthermore, we shall assume
the Marshallian partial equilibrium (despite its possible theoretical
weakness) will be adequate so that a full Walrasian equilibrium approach
will not be necessary. This is justifiable mainly on practical grounds.
With these assumptions, our discussion of welfare implications will
rely mainly on the concepts of consumer's surplus and producer's surplus.
This is done even though we realize that these concepts may have their limitations.
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The Nature of Technological Progress in a Market Economy
Most theoretical and empirical studies of technological progress
in a market economy have been limited to macroeconomic analyses.
While the theoretical discussions are largely related to various growth
models, such as Harrod-Domar model, the empirical investigations are
largely associated with Cobb-Douglas or Constant Elasticity of Substitution
(CES) Production Functions.
In general, technological progress can be regarded as either
embodied or disembodied into the capital or labor. Although embodied
models may be more satisfactory theoretically, disembodied models
are by far much easier to implement (and have been used empirically
with some success). Furthermore, technological progress can also
be labor augmenting (e. g., Harrod-Neutral) capital augmenting
(e. g., Solow-Neutral), or both labor and capital augmenting (e. g.,
Hicks-Neutral). The type of technological progress not only affects
how the supply curve is shifted but also determines the distribution
of income among the owners of different resources (labor or capital).
The issues related to incorre distribution are obviously important and
deserve further investigation. In what follows, our discussion of the
welfare implications of technological progress, however, will be limited
to its impact on the society as a whole and the distribution of the gain
(or loss) between producers and consumers.
Production Technology and Supply Function
As indicated earlier, the economic values of the information
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gathered by ERTS-1 type earth resources observation systems to the
private sector of the economy may be judged from its impact on equi-
librium of the market of final consumption goods reached through the
price mechanism. For simplicity, we shall consider only one commodity.
The Marshallian partial equilibrium approach to be discussed below can
be generalized, as was done in Walrasian general equilibrium approach.
The substance of the analytical approach can be made clear within the
simpler framework. Briefly, the equilibrium values of the quantity
and the price of a given market (where a given commodity is exchanged)
is determined by the solutions of the supply function and the demand
function. We now begin to examine how . technological progress such
as the introduction of ERTS-1 type earth observation systems can
affect the supply function. In order to do so, it is best to describe how
the supply function is usually derived.
Since we are dealing with the private sector of the economy in
this section, it is reasonable to assume that all firms and thus the
.industry as a whole behave in such a way as to maximize total profits
under a given technical feasibility constraint. For any given level of
the output price, there is a profit maximizing level of quantity which
the producers will be willing to supply. The functional relationship
representing the feasibility constraint between maximum output for
a given input(s) (or minimum input(s) for a given output) is the pro-
duction function. The functional relationship between the profit maxi-
mizing output and the output price is the supply function.
The feasibility constraint or the state of technology for the
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production of a given commodity may be summarized in the production
function as
y = f(xl, x2 . .. Xn) (1)
where y and x I , x 2 ... xn represent the quantities of output and inputs
respectively. The profits may be expressed as
[= R-C
= P(y)y - IPi(x) . x 1  (2)
where R and C are total revenue and total cost, and P(y) is the
inverse demand function of the output y, and Pi(xi) are the inverse
supply functions' of the factor inputs. Under the assumption of perfect
competition in the output market, P(y) = P, implying perfectly elastic
demands for the outputs of individual firms. Each producer may be
supposed to minimize total cost for the production of any given level
of output y. In other words, he is supposed to minimize
S= P i(Xi) I x -i [f(xl, zx - xn) - (3)
Denoting the resulting optimum input combination as x i (i = 1, 2, . . .n)
the corresponding minimum total cost is simply C* = IPi(x )x . Since.
this minimum total cost is dependent on a given output level, by varying
y, we shall be able to obtain the total cost function as
C* = XPi(x.) x.
= Pix () x. (y) (4)
SF(y)
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From (4), the marginal cost function can be derived as
MC - F' (y) =P (5)
which is also the supply function of the firm. By summing the supply
of all firms at each given level of prices, the industry supply function
of a given commodity can be obtained.
So far, we have demonstrated the derivation of the industry
supply function for a given commodity based on a given technology or
production function. The introduction of the ERTS-1 type earth re-
sources observation systems may be expected to change the technology
or production function of a given commodity. Therefore, the resulting
industry supply function may also be expected to change. The precise
nature of such a change cannot be determined without specific knowledge
of the production functions for both the existing technology and the
potential new technology. Furthermore, it must be pointed out that it
is not unlikely that the new technology which is beneficial to the society
as a whole may not always be the most profitable to the private industry.
In this case, some form of government intervention may not only be
justifiable but also desirable. The problem is important and deserves
further investigation.
Before entering the discussion of the demand for final consumption
goods, it is worthwhile to mention the derived demand for factor inputs,
which may include information obtainable from the ERTS-1 type earth
resource observation systems. From the first order of conditions for
the minimization of (3) consisting of n + 1 equations, we can derive n
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factor input demand functions and the value of X in terms of n factor
prices and output level. Consider one of these n factor inputs as in-
formation obtainable from ERTS-1 type earth resources observation
systems, the value of the information can be estimated from its
derived demand function. Similar derived demand functions for the
information from the production of all commodities can be summed
up vertically to obtain total derived demand for information, treating
the information as "collective goods" or "public goods." On the other
hand, if the information gathered by the satellite can be treated as
private goods, then horizontal summation may be done to obtain total
derived demand for information. This latter approach is perhaps less
applicable. Once the value of information can be determined through
its demand function, the desirability of an information gathering system
can be evaluated if in addition the cost function of providing the informa-
tion is known. In general, alternative derived demand functions may
associate with different information gathering systems which usually
involve different cost functions. Theoretically, such an approach of
evaluating the value of information at the level of factor input market
may be more satisfactory. Practically, such an approach is likely to be
much more difficult than the alternative of evaluating the value of in-
formation at the level of final consumption goods markets. We shall
now turn to consider the demand side of a final consumption good.
Consumption Preference and Demand Function
The derivation of the demand function of a final consumption good
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based on utility maximization subject to a budget constraint is relatively
straightforward. Briefly, the consumer is supposed to maximize
U = U(x 1 , x 2 ,...n) - L Pixi - B) (6)
where U(x 1 , x 2 , . . .x n ) is his utility function and B is a. given budget.
The demand functions of n commodities and the value of p are obtained
by solving the n + 1 equations of the first order conditions.
The demand function of a commodity which may require informa-
tion obtainable from the ERTS-1 type observation systems is not sup-
posed to be affected by a change in production technology resulting
from the introduction of the ERTS-1 type observation systems. It may,
however, be expected to shift because of the population growth or a
change in preference or taste, etc. The derivation of the industry demand
curve from the individual demand curves is straightforward and thus
need not be elaborated. Compared with the estimation of supply function
and the assessment of the effect of technological change, the estimation
of demand functions for various commodities, such as agricultural
products or any other products, is relatively easy. Furthermore, many
empirical analyses of demand functions already exist and can be
very useful.. 'A review of empirical studies of supply and demand
analyses will not be presented.
Technological Change and Market Equilibrium
We have indicated that the market equilibrium is represented by
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a solution satisfying both the industry demand function and supply
function. We have also suggested that the impact of a technological
change can be summarized in a change in the supply functions of the
relevant commodities. In general, it can be shown that technological
progress is beneficial to the society as a whole and to the consumers
as a group, though its effect on the producers as a group may be
uncertain, if the demand curve is sloping downward to the right and
the industry is subjected to decreasing return to scale so that its
supply curve is sloping upward to the right. This result is brought
about through the lowering of the equilibrium price and the increase
of equilibrium quantity.
In the accompanying Figure IIA-11, S 1 and S2 represent the
supply curves associated with the "old" and "new" technology, and
D represents the unchanged demand curve of a given commodity,
say agricultural product.
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Figure IIA-11. The Impact of Technological Change
on Equilibrium Price and Quantity
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As is drawn, the equilibrium point moves from e 1 to e 2 as the tech-
nological progress is introduced. The figure also shows that the
equilibrium price moves down from P1 to P2 and the equilibrium
quantity moves up from q 1 to q2' In terms of consumer's surplus,
as a result of technological progress, the consumers as a group
have gained Plele2 P additional consumer's surplus. The producer's
surplus has been changed from the shaded area Plelal to the shaded
area P 2 e 2 a2 1 Whether there is a net gain to the producers as a group
is not certain. It is entirely possible that their surplus may be reduced
as a result of technological progress. From the society's point of view,
taking into account both the consumer's and producer's surpluses, the
social welfare has improved by a l e le 2 a2 representing the sum of
P l el e 2 P 2 and the net change from Plel1 q to P 2 e2 q2 .
In the previous discussion, we have implicitly assumed that
the form of government intervention, if any, has already been taken
into account in constructing the supply and demand curves. In the
existence of any government intervention, the cost of this program
must also be appropriately taken into consideration. In view of the
predominant importance of government intervention in agricultural
sectors which is likely to be important to users of the information
to be gathered by the ERTS-1 type observation systems, we may now
consider the impact of government intervention more explicitly. Since
1 More generally, the producer's surpluses before and after technological
progress ar e Pleq11 0 minus foql Sl(Q)dQ and PZe 2 920 minus f2 S 2 (Q)dQ
respectively.
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the forms of government intervention are numerous, and the existing
literature covers many of the relevant analytical tools, we shall attempt
here to consider only a few cases to illustrate how the government inter-
vention may affect the market equilibrium.
In a very general term, in addition to sponsoring research and
development, government agencies may intervene in a private market
by affecting either the supply curve or demand curve. For example,
the government may obtain an agreement from the farmers to limit their
land area devoted to the planting of certain agricultural products by
granting subsidies. This type of program will effectively shift the
supply curve to the left. The government may also enter the market
directly as a purchaser or indirectly by subsidizing other purchasers
in order to keep the price of an agricultural product at a higher level
than otherwise. This type of program will effectively shift the demand
curve to the right. In what follows, we shall briefly consider the impact
technological progress in the presence of these two types of government
programs. We recognize that the. actual government programs are much
more complicated. The discussion to be presented serves mainly as
an illustration.
Referring to Figure IIA-12, the supply curves Sl and S 2 as well as
the demand curve D represent the market supply and demand without
government intervention, where S 1 and S 2 represent "old" and "new"
technologies. Suppose as a result of government intervention, the land
area has been limited and the supply curves become S 1 and S 2 instead
*
of S 1 and S 2 , the resulting equilibria are e* and e 2 instead of e 1 and e 2 .
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Figure IIA-12. The Impact of Technological Change on
Equilibrium Price and Quantity with
Government Intervention in Supply Side
The equilibrium prices are higher than those under free market for the
corresponding technologies and the equilibrium quantities are smaller.
The consumer's surpluses are reduced as a result of government inter-
vention, and the producer's surpluses, excluding government subsidies,
are also smaller. For the producers to accept voluntary compliance
in restricting their supply, their total.profits including government pay-
ments of subsidies would have to be larger than what they can obtain
from the market without government intervention. The minimum amounts
of government subsidies are shown as two shaded areas for the two alter-
native technologies in Figure IIA-12.
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On the other hand, if the government intervenes by adopting a
policy of price support, the effect of the program may effectively
shift the demand curve to the right. For example, the government may
decide to purchase excess supply at a fixed higher price level than what
may prevail under free market conditions. Referring to Figure IIA-13,
S2 and D all have the same meaning as before, and D* may be termed
effective demand, incorporating the purchases made by the government
(with a given amount of subsidies). The amount of subsidy is represented
by two equal rectangular shaded areas in Figure IIA-13.
In general, the equilibrium prices under both intervention
conditions are higher than the corresponding'free market prices. The
equilibrium quantity demanded by the private consumers directly are
decreased as a result of government intervention which causes higher
prices. But the quantities of supply are increased compared with other-
wise. The technological progress has obviously increased consumer's
surplus, but the impact on producers is again uncertain. From the point
of view of the society as a whole, technological progress is clearly
beneficial regardless of whether government intervenes in the market or
not. Whether government should intervene or not must be based mainly
on other considerations.
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Figure IIA-13. The Impact of Technological Change on
Equilibrium Price and Quantity with
Government Intervention on Demand Side
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E. Externalities
Free market pr'ices provide an efficient allocation of scarce
resources in the economy. The pricing process determines who gets
resources and output, what output is produced with the resources, and
how the resources are combined to produce the output. The prices
paid resources also prbvide the means to allocate the output or
benefits.
However, there is a class of benefits (and costs) for which the
pricing mechanism breaks down. These anomalous benefits (and costs)
are known as externalities.
Externalities are effects produced by individuals or groups for
which they can receive no compensation when beneficial to others and
for which they cannot be easily charged when costly to others.
The market can fail in two ways when faced with externalities.
It can fail to supply (or supply an insufficient quantity) a product or
service when the externalities are beneficial effects, e. g., it does
not pay private firms to build roads for commercial profit because
there is no practical way to collect fees from those who use the roads.
The second way the market can fail is to allow a product or good to be
supplied (or to be supplied in great quantity) when the externalities are
undesirable effects, e. g., a firm may market a product whose pro-
duction generates such air pollution that if the firm could be charged
for the cost of the damage done by the pollution, the product would
not be produced.
Situations in which externalities are present are not hopeless,
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however. For it is here that the government plays an important role.
The government is in the position to supply those products with
beneficial externalities and to charge (by taxation; see Baumol-
Oates technique [48] ) for undesirable externalities.
In an earlier paper [2] MATHEMATICA dealt with externalities
rigorously. Here it is our purpose to relate e:ternalities to the ERTS
experiments.
Externalities are important to ERTS experiments because many
of the benefits of ERTS are in the area of resource management and
typically take the form of externalities - benefits to society as a whole
such as pollution control, weather forecasting, water resource manage-
ment, etc., for which the market mechanism does not function optimally.
A look at U.S. Government budget outlays for resource manage-
ment functions should indicate implicitly where the government sees the
greatest beneficial externalities. Table IIA-3 breaks down by government
agency and organization the estimated outlays for fiscal 1973 for
seventeen resource management functions. Table IIA-4 gives the level
of spending by function for each year from 1965 to 1973. And Table IrA-5
contains the average annual increase in outlays by function for the years
1965 to 1973. All figures are from [531 , [54]
These tables give an overall picture of where and to what extent
the government is involved in providing services and goods in the area
of resource management which the market mechanism does not provide
to the public. It is in this framework that ERTS experiments may generate
government activity benefits by providing already existing goods and
services more cheaply and by providing totally new goods and services.
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Table IIA-4
U. S. GOVERNMENT BUDGET OUTLAYS RELATED TO RESOURCE
AND ENVIRONMENT MANAGEMENT BY FUNCTION (Million $)
Aggregated Resources
Management Function 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
354 Agricultural Land and Water
Resources 342 347 353 351 343 344 346 375 388
355 Research and Other Agricultural
Services 483 528 567 615 642 730 813 901 915
401 Water Resources and Power 1761 1940 2025 2069 2041 1983 2389 3005 3207
402 Land Management 509 556 618 639 643 754 837 935 918
403 Mineral Resources 59 62 73 85 71 94 130 121 103
404 ' Pollution Control and Abatement 134 158 190 249 303 350 701 1287 1541
405 Recreational Resources 215 241 285 331 372 370 479 642 640
409 Other Natural Resource Pr6grams 79 90 93 102 107 122 136 149 176
502 Water Transportation 728 708 765 844 864 902 1041 1200 1225
503 Ground Transportation 4092 4043 4093 4367 4413 4632 5070 5412 5720
506 Advancement of Business 405 351 332 447 152 487 738 744 642
507 Area and Regional Development 557 315 318 472 584 590 717 816 857
551 Community Planning Management
and Development 460 721 1023 1277 1509 2171 2486 2745 3009
152 Economic and Financial Assistance 2041 2329 3057 3053 2420 2231 1807 2376 2495
606 General Science 309 368 415 449 490 464 522 538 596
703 Social and Individual Services 249 410 692 831 888 1331 1617 2477 2297
351 Farm Income Stabilization 3667 2536 31.67 4542 5000 4589 3651 5501 5011
Estimate
Table IIA-5
Increases in U. S. Government Budget Outlays
1965-1973
Average Annual
Resource Management Function Increase
Pollution Control and Abatement 31.0%
Social and Individual Services 23. 3
Community Planning Management
and Development 19. 6
Recreational Resources 14.0
Advancement of Business 10.4
Area and Regional Development 10.4
Other Natural Resources Programs 9.5
Mineral Resources 8. 9
Research and Other
Agricultural Services 8.4
Land Management 7. 8
Water Transportation 7.4
Water Resources and Power 7. 1
General Science 6.8
Farm Income Stabilization 6. 1
Ground Transportation 4. 6
Agricultural Land and
Water Resources 1.2
Economic and Financial
Assistance -0.9 .
A-83
APPENDIX III
COST FORMS
A-84
Government Private
Activity Activity
I F
UNonrecurring Recurring Nonrecurring RecurringCosts Costs Costs Costs
Activity Activity Activity Activity
Level Level RDT&E Investment Level LevelRDT&E Investment Dependent Independent Dependent Independent
ORGANIZATION OF LIFE CYCLE COST ANALYSIS
TABLE IIIA-1
COSTS-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY
SYSTEM ALTERNATIVE
Non-Recurring Recurring
Fiscal Activity Level Activity Level Annual
Year RDT&E Investment Dependent Independent Costs
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
Totals
.A-86
TABLE IIIA-2
COSTS-PRIVATE ACTIVITY
SYSTEM ALTERNATIVE
Non-Recurring Recurring
Fiscal Activity Level Activity Level Annual
Year RDT&E Investment Dependent Independent Costs
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
Totals
A-87
TABLE IIIA-3
TOTAL COSTS
SYSTEM ALTERNATIVE
Fiscal Government Private Annual Costs DiscouNt Annual Costs
Year Activity Activity Undiscounted Factor- Discounted
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
Totals 7
*See next page.
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DISCOUNT FACTORS at 10%/o Rate
Proj e ct Dis count Dis count
Year factors' factors'
1 0.909091 0.954
2 0.826446 0.867
3 0.751315 0.788
4 0.683013 0.717
5 0.620921 0.652
6 0. 564474 .0.592
7 0.513158 0.538
8 0.466507 0.489
9 0.424098 0.445
10 0.385543 0.405
11 0.350494 0.368
12 0.318631 0.334
13 0.289664 0.304
14 0.263331 0.276
15 0.239392 0.251
16 0.217629 0.228
17 0.197845 0.208
18 0. 179859 0. 189
19 0.163508 0.172
20 0.148644 0.156
21 0.135131 0.142
22 0. 122846 0. 129
23 0.111678 0.117
24 0.101526 0.107
25 0.092296 0.097
The discount factors in this column implicitly assume end-of-year
lump-sum costs and returns. When costs and returns occur in a steady
stream, applying mid-year discount factors may be more appropriate.
**The discount factors in this column implicitly assume a steady stream
of costs and returns.
The selection of these discount factors is discussed in section 2. 6. 3. e
of Volume I.
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Appendix IV. FORM FOR ENUMERATION OF BENEFITS
The following form gives examples of the type of questions
which should be answered regarding the benefits realized by a par-
ticular ERTS application. The list should be exhaustive of the non-
quantifiable benefits as well as the quantifiable benefits.
The experimenter should check whether the benefit is
1. Domestic and/or international
2. Government oriented or private
3. Quantifiable or non- quantifiable
4. Possible, likely or certain that it will be realized
5. Partially, almost fully, or fully realized
6. An efficiency or non-efficiency consideration
Where the benefit is quantifiable an attempt should be made to
distinguish each of these elements in the model and the benefit estimate
should be derived by parametric analysis, especially with regard to the
extent to which the benefit is expected to be realized.
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Form A
Enumeration of Benefits
Probability that benefit Extent to which benefit Efficiency
will be realized was rcalized Consideratin
Form of Inter- Govern- Quanti- Non-Quanti- Almost Efficiency (Secondary
Benefit Domestic national ment Private fiablable fble Possible Likely Certain Partially 'ully Fully Consideration Effcct)
1.
2.
3.
- -*
INDEX
Abstract commodity approach, 20 Cost effectiveness analysis, 6, A-57 to.A-62
Activity level, 10, A-58 versus coat-benefit analysis - 6, A-57 to A-62
Alternatives, 3, 5, 6. A-4 Council on environmental quality guidelines, 8
feasible system alternatives - 3, 6 Criteria, 5, 6, 7
enumeration of - 5 efficiency - 6
criteria for selecting among - 6 non-efficiency - 7
hypothetical example - A-4 Credibility, 3
Assumptions, 5. A-3 Cross-reference chart, 26
specification of - 5 Decision uncertainties, It
in hypothetical example - A-3 quantification - It
Baseline survey activity, A-63 Deflation, 12
Baseline technology, A-57, A-58 Delphi technique, A-48
Bayes rule, A-23 Demand, 14, 16, 20, A-70,. A-71
Beneficiaries, 9 derived - 14, 20
as opposed to users - 9 direct - 14, 20
classification - 9 analysis and price considerations - 16
Benefits, 4, 10, 15, 16, 18, 20, A-3, A-S, A-8, A-38, A-56 to A-78 derivation of demand function - A-70, A-71
listing - 15 Demand function, A-70, A-71
measuring - 16, A-57 to A-66 of final consumption good, derivation - A-70, A-71
definition - 20, A-56 Depth of analysis, 4
in hypothetical example - A-3, A-5 Derived demand, 14, A-70
direct - 18, 20, A-8 definition - 14
induced - 18, A-8 functions - A-70
definition and measurement - A-56 to A-78 "Deterministic modeling, 10, A-SO
form for enumeration of - A-91 Direct benefits, 17, 18
actual vs. potential - 4, 10, 15 definition - 18
public - 15 Direct demand, 14
private - 15 definition, 14
incremental - A-38 Discount factors, at 10% rate, A-89
Bibliography, 27 to 32 Discount rate, 21, A-3, A-38 to A-47
Classification, 9, A-4 selecting - 21
users - 9 in hypothetical example - A-3
geographic area - 9 'used in U.S. - A-42 to A-44
political division - 9 and flexibility approach - A-44 to A-47
beneficiaries - 9 and net present value - A-45
hypothetical example - A-4 Discounting, 12, 21
Cobb-Douglas production function, A-66 begins - 21
Constant dollars vs. current dollars, 12 Dynamic costing, 13
Constant elasticity of substition production function, A-66 Economic uselife, A-34, A-59, A-61
Consumer's surplus, 17, 18, 20, A-54, A-63, A-65 Efficiency, 6, 15, A-47, A-57, A-59
definition - 17 efficiency considerations, definition - 6
Cost, 22, 23, 24, A-9, A-38, A-74, A-85 to A-88 criteria - 6
incremental - 22, A-38 public vs. private - 15
sunk - 22 frontier - A-57
opportunity -22 equal capability - A-59
life cycle - 22 equal budget - A-47, A-59
non-recurring - 23, 24 Efficiency frontier, A-57
recurring - 23, 24 Elasticity, 20, A-9
forms - A-85 to A-88 definition - 20, A-9
flowchart - A-74 unitary - 20
in hypothetical example - A-9 Employment effects, 8
Cost benefit analysis, 2, 4, 6, 9, 10, 12, 22, A-57 to .A-62 Environmental effects, 7, 8
and shadow prices - 22 " council on environmental quality guidelines - 8
flowchart - Z Enual budget approach, 20, A-47, A-59, A-62
versus cost-effectiveness analysis - 6, A-57 to A-62 definition - 20
general model, 4, 9 benefits - A-62
uncertainty and, 10 demand curve - A-62
time considerations,. 12 efficiency - A-47, A-59
Cost benefit estimates, 10
A-92
Equal capability approach, 20, A-3, A-59, A-62 Monte Carlo simulation, II, A-48, A-52
definition - 20 definition - A-48 footnote
in hypothetical example - A-3 flowchart - A-52
benefits - A-62 Net benefit, 18
efficiency - A-59 Net present value, 4, A-45
Equal cost/unequal benefit analysis, 6 definition - 4
definition - 6 formula - 4
Errors, Type I & II, A-3, A-8, A-31, A-32 as a function of discount rates used - A-45
definition in hypothetical example - A-3 Non-efficiency, 7, 16, 23
in model - A-8 criteria - 7
in sensitivity analysis - A-31, A-32 considerations - 16
Externalities, 21, A-79, A-83 measurement of non-efficiency considerations - 23
definition - 21 ' Non-price considerations, 21
Factor input market, A-70 Non-recurring costs, 23
Final consumption goods market, A-70 definition, - 23
Final demand, 6, 14 Objective, 5, A-3
definition - 14 statement of - 5
Flexible approach to discount rates, A-44 to A-46, A-47 in hypothetical example - A-3
Flowcharts, 2, A-7, A-10, A-11, A-12, A-52, A-85 Opportunity costs, 22
cost benefit analysis - 2 definition - 22
risk analysis with Monte Carlo simulation - A-52 Parametric analysis, 4, 16
benefits model, hypothetical example - A-7 Planning horizon, 4, 6, 12, A-3. A-34 to A-38
aircraft only cost model, hypothetical example - A-10 in hypothetical example - A-3
satellite only cost model, Fiypothetical example - A-11 Present value, 12, 16, A-35, A-39
aircraft/satellite cost model, hypothetical example - A-12 in hypothetical example - A-35, A-39
life cycle cost analysis - A-85 Primary effects, 6, 8
Government activity, 10 definition - 6
Grazing land management procedure, A-i, A-2 Private activity, 10
Harrod-Domar model, A-66 Privately offered goods and services, 15, A-70
Horizontal summation, A-70 Probability, 10
and demand for private goods - A-70 Probability distribution functions, 11, 16, 22, A-48
Income distribution effects, 7 uncertainty and - 22, A-48
Incremental benefits, A-38 Producer's surplus, A-66
Incremental costs, 22, A-38 : Production functions, A-66, A-67
definition - 22 definition - A-67
Induced activity, A-63 Productivity measurement, 23
Induced benefits, 17, 18 Project scale, A-62
definition - 18 Publicly offered goods and services, 15, A-70
Infinite planning horizon, A-35, A-36 Ranking, 5, 24
formula, A-36 Rate of return, A-31, A-40
Inflation, 12 definition - A-31
Intermediate products, 14 Recurring costs, 23
International effects. 7 definition - 23
Iteration, 2. 9, 11 Resource and environment management, U.S. Government, A-82, A-8
for cost benefit analysis - 2, 9 Risk analysis, 11, A-22, A-23, A-46 to A-55
for Monte Carlo simulation, or risk analysis - 11 Results in hypothetical example - A-22, A-23
-Learning curves, 15 Risk aversion, A-35
Life cycle costing, 22, 23 Risk profiles, A-48
Market prices, 22 Secondary effects, 7
versus shadow prices - 22 definition - 7
Markov process, 13 non-efficiency considerations - 16
Marshallian equilibrium, A-65 Sensitivity analysis, 11. A-24, A-31, A-32, A-45 to A-47. A-50
Model, 4, 9, 10 results in hypothetical example - A-24, A-31, A-32
net present value - 4. and discount rate - A-45
cost-benefit - 4, 9 and flexible approach to discount rate - A-44 to A-47
mathematical - 9 weaknesses - A-50
deterministic - 10 Shadow prices, 22
versus market prices - 2Z
A-93
Simulation iteration, A-48
Social effects, 8
employment effects - 8
Social opportunity costs. A-39
definition - A-39
Social rate of discount, A-38 to A-47
definition - A-38
used in U.S. - A-42 to A-44
and flexibility approach - A-44 to A-47
Social welfare, A-74
Standard error of the sampling distribution of the sum (difference)
of means, formula - A-54 footnote
Sunk costs, 22, A-4, A-59
definition - 22
hypothetical example - A-4
Supply function, 16, A-64 to A-67
System selection, 23
Technical considerations, 9
Technological progress, A-57 to A-62, A-66
Three tier system, 5
Tiers, 3, 5
three tier system - 3, 5
Time dimension, 9, 12
and cost-benefit estimates - 12
Time preference, A-38, A-39, A-40
definition - A038
versus rate of time productivity - A-40
Time productivity, A-40
definition - A-40
versus rate of time preference - A-40
Trade-off analysis, 24, A-33
in hypothetical example - A-33
Type I & II Errors, A-3, A-8, A-31, A-32
definition in hypothetical example - A-3
in model - A-8
in sensitivity analysis - A-31, A-32
Uncertainty, 9, 10. 11, 13, 16, 22, A-48
cost benefit estimates and - 10, A-48
dynamic costing and - 13
sensitivity analysis and - 11
probability distribution function - 16, 22, A-48
Unequal cost/equal benefit analysis, 1, 6, A-3
definition - 6
in hypothetical example - A-3
Unequal cost/unequal benefit, 6
definition - 6
Unitary elasticity, 20
Users, 9
as opposed to beneficiaries - 9
classification - 9
Vertical summation, A-70
and demand for public good - A-70
Utility function, A-71
Walrasian equilibrium. A-65
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